Corporate Reputation Effect Constraints On The Behavior Of Alliance Partners The Opportunity To Study

The dissertation studies the governance thesis of opportunistic behavior between alliance partners based on corporate reputation effect(CRE).The opportunistic behavior mainly includes three types:adverse selection behavior(ASB),moral hazard behavior(MHB),and hold-up behavior(HUB). The study analyzes the mechanism of CRE by game analysis and quantitative method based on corporate reputation theory, contractual theory,corporate capability theory, game theory and information economics. Then ,we study how the CRE affects the partners' selection, and incentives or constrains the corporation behavior. Consequently ,reducing alliance partners'opportunism of adverse selection,moral hazard ,and hold-up. The main contents following:(1) The mechanism of CRE was explored. This part study mainly how the CR affects itself and the latent bargainers' decision.Cournot Game demstrates reputation may product Nash equilibrium.The reputation theory shows that CR not only reflects the firm's inherent personality.but also is strategic intangible capital(reputation capital). We bring forward basic three kinds of effect of reputation according to the relation between reputation theory and firm's behavior.They are information effect of CR,capital effect of CR, and psychological value. The information effect emphasizes the signaling function, the capital effect emphasizes the reputation effect on the firm's income, and the psychological value effect mainly illuminates that reputation may increase psychological satisfaction and provides direct incentive process. Then we constructed the mechanism model of CRE to demonstrate that reputation affects firm's behavior chiefly by opening out the firm's inherent type, changing the reputation rents ,and increasing the psychological satisfaction.(2) The constraint mechanism of CRE on alliance partner's adverse selection behavior. The ASB arises when there lies ex ante asymmetric information between the leading corporation and the latent partners, and it results in the leading firm choosing the improper partner but missing the right one which may increase the efficiency of the alliance .The signaling model of CR demonstrates that the CR can disclose the latent partner's type and other information , so ,it may constrain the ASB due to the hidden information by estimating their CR status to choose the latent partners. For empirical research, we construct the SEM in which the CR is regarded as exogenous variable, capability level(CL) ,trust level(TL) and compatibility identifing degree(CD) are regarded as mediator variables,and ASB is regarded as result variable. The path analysis illuminates that if the latent partner's CR is better ,the firm's CL,TL,and CD are higher. On the other hand ,these three mediator variables are the main criterion by which the leading firm choose its alliance partners. That is to say ,the leading firm can identify and choose the right partners to reduce the ASB by evaluating the latent partners' reputation.(3) The constraint mechanism of CRE on alliance partner's moral hazard behavior. The MHB arises ex post asymmetric information. After the alliance being set up ,the MHB probably appears when partner seeks itself unilateral interest by hiding information or action. The research takes CR into game model of MHB,and makes use of the theorem of KMRW to demonstrate that the CR may restrict the partner's MHB in repeated game. Then,we constructed a mediator effect model that includes an exogenous variable,CR;two mediator variables, relation capital and future income;and a result variable ,MHB. The hypotheses testing makes us know that the CR chiefly restrict partner's moral hazard by affecting the firm's relationship capital and its future income.(4) The constraint mechanism of CRE on alliance partner's hold-up behavior(HUB). The opportunistic behavior of HU is caused by the appropriable quasi-rents.But the appropriable quasi-rents can not necessarily result in the actual hold-up behavior unless the net quasi-rents exceeds the cost of HUB. At the same time,CR is strategic intangible capital, and the HUB will damage its CR ,consequently,increasing the cost of HUB. According to this ideas,the dissertation study the CRE on HUB using game analysis and empirical research. Game verifies the reputation effect may increase the cost of HUB,and good reputation will restrict the partner's HUB. The empirical analysis illuminates that the CRE on the HUB mainly work via the following mediator variables:self-enforcing range(SER),extorting rent cost(ERC),and relationship capital.(5) The dynamic process of CRE was analyzed.We mainly analyse the reputation's dynamic effect on its stakeholders and the partner's behavior by game model .It was proved that corporate reputation in this period would affect its stakeholder's anticipation of the corporate next peroid, and so,the stakeholders would make their decision according to the corporate present reputation .Their decision would affect the partner's income and so on.The CRE may return to affect the partner next reputation and decision behavior.In this way ,the CRE dynamic process may come into being.