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The shadow of the past: The influence of reputation on alliance choices

Posted on:2005-03-17Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:The Ohio State UniversityCandidate:Miller, Gregory DFull Text:PDF
GTID:1459390008993570Subject:Political science
Abstract/Summary:
Although alliances are the most studied phenomena in international relations, there are a number of unanswered questions. Numerous theories explain why alliances form and end, but we do not know how states choose their partners, or why they end when they do. In addition, despite the voluminous literature on alliances, almost no work explains the variation between alliance institutions. I suggest that a better understanding of reputation may help fill these gaps. If reputation matters, then we should see unreliable states (states that fail to honor their alliance commitments) being treated differently than reliable states (states that honor their commitments). Drawing from existing work in political science, as well as from anthropology, business, and game theory, I argue that reputation can affect a state's alliance autonomy. States that are perceived to be unreliable should have greater difficulty attracting new partners and preserving existing alliances than states with a reputation for being reliable. Furthermore, a state's reputation may explain some of the variation between alliances, such as the up-front costs incurred by the signatories, the explicitness of the language, and the level of military integration. To determine the effect of reputation on alliance choices, I test my argument against four cases prior to the First World War. I find that while a state's reputation has little influence on the duration of alliances, unreliable states do have more trouble forming partnerships, especially with reliable states. I also confirm that a state's reputation affects the institutional design of its alliances. Specifically, states with unreliable reputations have more autonomy in choosing their partners and in setting the terms of the alliance. I also discover that a reputation for reliability creates a moral hazard problem, whereby a state with reliable allies will be emboldened to challenge its adversaries. These findings have implications for theories of alliance formation, duration, and variation, but they are also relevant for policymakers; if leaders are concerned about their state's autonomy, then they must act to develop and preserve its reputation for reliability.
Keywords/Search Tags:Reputation, Alliance, States, State's
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