Licensing, Innovation And Social Welfare

In theory,the research on licensing focus on the bargain of licensing,especially on the case of moral hazard and adverse selection causing by asymmetric information. But this study neglect the influence on social welfare caused by adverse selection from the technology purchaser,and neglect to study how the bargain of licensing change when the purchaser be in possession of innovation capability,say nothing of research on the influence on social welfare from licensing,innovation integrating the innovation cost,efficiency of the domestic manufacturer.Basing on existing literature,this thesis discuss the influence on the bargain of licensing caused by the private information of the technology purchaser,the innovation capability and the cooperate innovation alliance of the domestic manufacturers,and so on the encouraging policy from domestic government.More, analyze the impact on social welfare from the bargain of licensing caused by different factor.When the foreign patent holder do not take part in competition of monopoly market, assuming the technology purchaser owns private information,the two-part tariff licensing can be used,from which the domestic firm can get added information rent and social welfare suffer more losing.Following,assuming the domestic manufacturer owns innovation capability,by which the firm could compel the foreign patent holder reduce the licensing price.In addition,the domestic firm can get added income and the domestic welfare can get added increase by the asymmetric information on innovation efficiency.When the government provide the allowance for innovation,the domestic manufacturer will be encouraged to engage in innovation,and social welfare enhanced.When the foreign patent holder take part in competition of monopoly market,with the symmetric information the patent holder will adopt the strategy of royalty licensing,which has no impact on profit of the domestic firm and social welfare.Assuming the asymmetric information,the tactics of licensing to all and licensing to good only will appear.When the domestic manufacturer owns innovation capability,the patent holder will adopt the tactics of royalty licensing,which is lower than one without innovation capability.In addition,the government could impose the foreign competitor and give allowance to the domestic innovation firm.The taxation will enhance the profit of domestic firm and the social welfare,but has no impact on the tactics of royalty licensing.While the allowance will activate the firm to innovate,which reduce the price of licensing and increase the social welfare.When the foreign patent is not a competitor in the domestic oligarchy market,assuming the symmetric information,the patent holder will license to one domestic firm by the tactic of fixed-fee licensing when the market scale is small,and to two by the tactic of royalty licensing by contraries.When the domestic firm owns private information,the added information rent can be gotten and social welfare will be enhanced.When one of the two domestic firms owns innovation capability,the patent holder could only license to the other firm by the tactic of fixed-fee licensing,which enhance social welfare while reduce the profit of the innovator.When the two domestic firms own innovation capability, cooperative innovation will benefit all.The spill degree of technology will determine the form of cooperative innovation,which reduce the price of licensing,accordingly increase social welfare.When the foreign patent participate in the competition with the two domestic oligarchy firms owning no innovation capability,the foreign patent holder will license to all the domestic firms by the tactic of royalty licensing,which brings no influence to social welfare.When one of the two domestic firm owns innovation capability,the foreign patent holder will license to the other firm by the tactic of fixed-fee licensing,which decrease the profit of the innovator while enhance social welfare.When the two domestic firms own innovative capability, there is a optimal mode of cooperative innovation,of which the spill degree of technology and efficiency of innovation influence the domestic firm profit and social welfare.At last,an experiential analysis is made that the connection among licensing,innovation and benefit with the data coming from Chinese high-technology industry from 1995 to 2005.Find that there is a reliant relation between innovation and licensing.The domestic innovation promote the profit evidently,while licensing restrain the current profit slightly.But licensing boost the profit indirectly and subsequently,by coming into being fixed assets and stimulating innovation.