Study Of Chinese Commercial Bank Executives Incentive And Restraint Mechanisms

Senior managers' performances make tremendous impacts on commercial bank' s operation and development, so that it is one of important factors for promoting commercial banks' competitiveness to encourage senior managers acting for the purpose of maximizing the value of commercial banks. In order to set up general theory fundament for China commercial bank' s issue, this paper researches incentives theory, analyses general law of senior managers incentive issue, and builds up a dominant commercial bank executives motivation model, hidden incentive model and Game model between executives with the use of game theory. Based on the example of United States, Germany and Japan commercial bank, this paper studies deeply on the practices and experiences of international commercial bank executives encouragement, and sum up the history and process of Chinese commercial banks executives encouragement, and analyses the status quo and existing problems of China's commercial bank' s motivation issues on base of empirical methods and listed bank data. Finally, author put forth some advices for building more efficient incentive system for Chinese commercial bank from the angle of environmental construction, hiring executives mechanism, performance appraisal and compensation incentives.