Study On The Price And Quality Level Decision-making Of Remanufacturerd Product In The Closed-loop Supply Chain

In the closed-loop supply chain system, the quality level of remanufactured product is composed of the quality level of the remanufacturable part in used product and the quality level of unremanufacturable part selected by the remanufacturer in the process of remanufacturing. The information on quantity and quality of the remanufacturable part collected by collectors or 3LPs is uncertain and effects on remanufacturer'efficiency of reclaiming and remanufacturing. Secondly, when the new and remanufactured products, which are competing on price and quality level, are in the same market, the heterogeneous consumer will select one of the both based on the principia of his own utility-maximization. Therefore, consumer behavior will have impact on the quality and price decision-making of remanufacturer.By adopting theories and methods of Game Theory,Operations Research,Marketing Science and Industrial Economics, this research studies the manufacturer how to decide the penalty rate of defective remanufacturable part and the inspection rate on incoming items from retailer to supervise the quantity and quality of remanufacturable part and how to decide the optimal price and quality level in monopoly or competitive market.At first, we study the quality inspection policy in the single period decentralized closed-loop supply chain composed by a manufacturer and a retailer. We consider the manufacturer, how to decide the penalty rate of defective remanufacturable part and the inspection rate on remanufacturable part from retailer, and the retailer how to decide the return rate of remanufacturable part and the inspection rate on remanufacturable part from consumer. We derive the optimal penalty rate, return rate, inspection rate of the manufacturer and retailer, the threshold and means that the manufacturer adopts in inspection actions.Then we construct the relationship of quality level between the remanufactured product and the new one. Considering the relationship of quality level, quantity constrained, and consumers with heterogeneous valuations for the same product characteristics, we prove that when both new and remanufactured products with same brand in the market, given discrete unremanufacturable part's quality level, the manufacturer has an exclusive price of remanufactured product to maximize his profit.And then, considering the relationship of quality level, quantity constrained, and consumers with heterogeneous valuations for the product characteristics, we study the first-degree price discrimination policy of remanufacturer and manufacturer based on complete recycling model. The results indicate that if there is no surplus remanufacturerd product in the sale period, the remanufacturer won't entirely match the need of the low-end market but enter the high-end market partly. With the quality of unremanufacturable part or with the influenced by the quality of the remanufacturable part increased, the market coverage of remanufacturer will move to the one with higher valuation. If only the manufacturer adopts the first-degree price discrimination policy, there exit the equilibrium quality and price.At last, considering the relationship of quality level, quantity constrained, and consumers with heterogeneous price sensitivity, we use a single cost function class to study the price and quality competition between the manufacturer and remanufacturer based on free recycling model. The results indicate that when the remanufacturerd product enters the market at the beginning of the first period, the manufacturer has the largest profit in the event of the largest quality gap. We obtain the sufficient condition under which the remanufacturer has a lower limit equilibrium profit.