Research Of The Hamornize Mechanism Of Rural Credit Cooperative Based On Shareholding Cooperative System

With development of the management science, Stakeholder Theory is highly valued by our country academic circles, the coordination problem of benefits conflict among stakeholders is fully pay attention to by China's practice. In recent years, based on the reform of share cooperation, the rural credit cooperatives came forth stakeholder such as shareholder, manager and government etc. New share cooperation system of the rural credit cooperatives is given the dual target of "support three agricultures" and "business operation". In the rural credit share cooperation system, harmonizing stakeholder and coordinating the dual target became a new research realm in the stakeholder coordination mechanism theories and usage of.After investigated the development of the rural credit cooperatives, and empirical research on the stakeholder coordination mechanism with already exist rural credit share cooperation system, this paper proposed cooperation system is hardly to coordinated the dual target of "support three agricultures" and "business operation", and pointed out the path dependence of the rural credit share cooperation system came from depended relation among its main stakeholder. More over, this paper research mainly on the rural credit share cooperation system and its stakeholder coordination mechanism, the study include four parts.Firstly, based on the ownership configuration characteristics of the stakeholder, combination of resource proffered by "core stakeholder" , this paper researched Pareto Optimality of bargain relation in the share cooperation system with bargain efficiency theories, and established stakeholder bargain model of the share cooperation system. We optimize portfolio of capital resource and non-capital resource, and analyzed elasticity of resource. This paper used coefficient of control power to build up the bargain efficiency model of the share cooperation system. Considered the influence from the variety of the trade cost and the different combination of the control power coefficient, this paper analyzed the effect of rural credit cooperatives stakeholder.Secondly, this paper based on new ways of Asset Special Purpose Theory and Opportunism Behavior Theory, aimed at the design produce of rural credit share cooperation system and the present condition that shareholder's property right was insufficiency, studied the stability problem of the share cooperation system and built up an evolve game model about internal stability balanced of the share cooperation system, and empirical studied with a bank's data show the model is availability. We get some conclusions as follows.1. It is a full and needed condition to keep share stability of the share cooperation system that the share income of shareholder is bigger than the average income of society capital.2. It is a needed condition to implement cooperation while stockholders are same share but different right and to keep share stability that corporation stockholder's opportunism behavior income smaller their reciprocity behavior income.3. In asset-special-purpose income that natural person stockholder acquired, extension of impropriate quasi-rent in reason should be a location that restricted by the share income of rural cooperation and the average income of society capital.4. If the opportunism behavior no influenced to the share income, it need the cooperation surplus that came from the cooperation of shareholders to keep the share stability of the share cooperation system. If the opportunism behavior has certain degree influence to the share income, the ownership structure of share cooperation system can carry out stability balanced while the impropriate quasi-rent of the legal person shareholder smaller than the share income decreased by opportunism behavior.Thirdly, this paper descript balanced district that shareholder and government are faced with confliction of twain targets, built up the benefits related strategy choice model of the rural credit cooperation core stakeholder with altruism, put forward that raising shareholder spirit income can moderate benefits conflict of stakeholders, thus provide new coordination thinking for the twain targets balanced development of the rural cooperation. The empirical research got some conclusions as follow.1. Because stakeholder under the influence of factors, such as shareholder spirit income, shareholder preference, positive inspirit and the administration punish etc, we must full consideration the different influence degree on government public target by the spirit income of rural cooperation shareholder and different the preference of shareholder, then all that government positive inspirit and administration punish strategy were surely effectual, so it would implemented evolutionarily stable equilibrium between rural credit cooperatives shareholder behavior and the government behavior.2. The shareholder's altruism preference was more benefit to implemented evolutionarily stable equilibrium than self-regard preference. For shareholder preference, the administration punishment strategy has more influence than administration positive inspirit strategy, so it was more benefit to implemented evolutionarily stable equilibrium between rural credit cooperatives shareholder behavior and the government behavior.3. Best equilibrium stable strategy of government were to carries out that the shareholder spirit income is big at its cost expenditure and the shareholder preference keep consistently under the different government strategy, if so, no matter what the shareholder can express altruism preference.Fourly, Summarized Common Governance Theory and its fulfillment development, this paper built up the share cooperation government mode with analyzed bound rational and information asymmetry that influence on common government mode. More conclusions were that the multilateral inter-restrict mode that the employee participate can hold back control-power and decrease trade cost, that the vote equilibrium mechanism of altruism can encourage a " altruism punishment" behavior in company government and decrease trade cost.