Airline And Hotel Alliance Optimal Decision-making And Revenue Allocation Mechanism

The current tourism market shows a wide range of new features: customers'diversified demand, tourism products/services'short life cycles, the rapid expansion of the number of tourism product/service, the more and more high expectation for tourism products and services, saturation of the mature market and customers'uncertain demand. These factors lead to"disturbances of the market"to enhance. Traditional operation mode that a single tourism enterprise merely depends on its own resources has been difficult to adapt to the changing requirements. The enterprise must integrate external resources to implementation supply chain management, from the market competition of a single tourism enterprise toward the market competition between tourism supply chains. Based on the thought of tourism supply chain"horizontal integration", most domestic and foreign airlines and hotels actively integrate them own route network, sales network and the resources of destination, and optimize the allocation of resources, create"Ticket + Room"value-added products, exploit a new market. This collaboration fashion can achieve a win-win, even multiple win situations.However, the key of the continuous cooperation is that airline and hotel can reach an agreement about revenue allocation. Due to airline and hotel are two different stakeholders, the objectives of both are to maximize their own interest, it is difficult to achieve consensus on revenue allocation, thereby resulting in low efficiency of the league system and even the breakdown of this cooperation. The core of this study is to maximize the total revenue of the league and to improve both parties'revenue after airline and hotel launch"Ticket + Room"travel packages. Specifically, it is to seek an optimal ordering quantity and an optimal ordering price among both parties. The optimal ordering quantity determines the total revenue of the league, and the optimal ordering price is related with revenue allocation between airline and hotel, which are the key factors in the problem.On the basis of studying the related literature about revenue management, tourism supply chain and supply chain management, this paper is based on the ideas of non-cooperative game and cooperative game to build quantitative analysis models of revenue allocation under the condition of airline and hotel with dual capacity constraints, and to discuss the available coordination mechanisms to maximize the total revenue of the league and to improve both parties'revenue. First of all, this paper studies the optimal revenue when both sides make decentralized decision, including hotel and airline as a leader of Stackelberg game analysis respectively; then it studies the optimal revenue when both sides make centralized decision, and uses Shapley-value method to reasonably allocation the largest total revenue generated by both sides cooperation in according with the own marginal contribution, to balance the collective rationality and the individual rationality. Then, it studies the non-cooperative game strategies of airline and hotel using revenue-sharing contract, and proves revenue-sharing mechanism is a perfect coordination mechanism to give attention to the collective rationality and individual rationality. Based on the above basic models, it takes into account some factors such as opportunity cost and overbooking to expand the basic model, and analyze the non-cooperative game and cooperative game of revenue under the different expansion.