Study On Incentive Theory Of Excutive Of SOE Based On Equilibrium Of Profit

What extent that the executives of state-owned enterprises play an active role directly impacted enterprises development and profitability.The executives of state-owned enterprises as a operational human capital is the core of enterprise resources,as the existence of principal-agent relationship and the process and the results of the work can not be observed,only through incentives in order to maximize its full Potential.As a result,their effective incentive particularly became important.In this dissertation,learning from previous research,doing up the needs of executives of state-owned enterprises,brought out the executives' demand model, designed the incentives mechanism,concluded an important Significance from a new perspective on the issue of incentives executives.This dissertation firstly analysis the theoretical basis of the incentives mechanism of state-owned enterprises' executives.That included management incentive theory,modern economic theory of incentives and incentive system economics theory,any theory can not be a complete understanding of enterprises incentives.The problem must be overcome through combining the theoretical research results to form a complete incentives theoretical system of state-owned enterprise.Demand is the premise of incentives,only the existence of demand can lead to incentives.In this dissertation,direction at executives of state-owned enterprises needs and demand characteristics,through comprehensive analysising of existing research results,combinated the competence theory,theory of career and human resource management theory,from the current position of the match and be able to post jobs in the future Adaptability,with executives of the characteristics of professional ethics and moral point of view,put forward the demand models of executives of state-owned enterprises,which including the authorization of the main demands,the development needs of professional,moral needs of the demand,and every dimension connotation was caused to be analysised deeply.Executives of state-owned enterprises behavior problem is the important content of incentive and restriction mechanism.This dissertation carried out a comprehensive analysis of behavior problem using game theory methods,when standardizing the management of the executives,the focus of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises and team executives --- commissioned by the agency's balance of the game,had an in-depth study on the long and short-term incentives for the effective integration of state-owned enterprises executives,analysised the effects through game theory.The research results showed that the owners of state-owned enterprises only increase the cost of behavior problem of the state-owned enterprises executives or reduced the loss of income and increase the probability of supervision can reduce the occurrence of behavior problem,and enhance the enthusiasm of executives of state-owned enterprises.Incentive mechanism designing of executives of state-owned enterprises is the core of this dissertation.This dissertation drives the different needs of the dimensions to meet the demand for a degree.Focus on meeting the needs of the degree of achievement of the state-owned enterprises executive incentives to carry out an deeply research and thorough discussion.First of all,the analysis of the principal - agent relationship under the incentive mechanism as a platform for research on the conditions under asymmetric information and symmetric information under the condition of state-owned enterprises executives,monitoring mechanisms and incentives to integrate the issues of expansion of research.Finally,incentives for the establishment of state-owned enterprises executives incentive to contribute to their efforts and the efforts of the impact of the proceeds were discussed.Research results showed that as a result of information asymmetry in the corporate supervision and management of the distribution is uneven,therefore,first of all set up to meet the incentive compatibility constraints and constraints involved in the optimal incentive contract model is the key to protect the incentive effect.Explore the support coming from practice evidence on basis suggesting from dynamic stock system operation in Xiang Fan City based on theory research. Because the designing idea of dynamic stock system has considered many dimensions mentality need of state-owned enterprises executives,has boosted state-owned enterprise height being in charge of team stability and the degree of satisfaction improvement,economic results improved noticeably.Reforming practice of dynamic stock system operation in Xiang Fan City having provided practice to the main body of a operation handling evidence,support and having reinforced the main thought of this dissertation that covered incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises executives based on balanced profit.