Research On The Incentive Of State-owned Enterprises' Managers

The incentive of State-owned Enterprises' managers is the critical problem in its reforming. In effect, the incentive means the principal pays a certain scarce resourse to the agent for the compatibile of each other's aim. Recently, due to the non-marketable manager choice, the distortion in managers' promotion incentive, the larger proportion of position comsume in managers' income, the weak effectiveness of our capital market and the lag of connected laws and regulations, State-owned Enterprises tried various ways in the incentive of its managers, but in total there still has not an effective model. At the same time, State-owned Enterprises' property character, function position, distribution state and historical factors makes the incentive of State-owned Enterprises' managers quite different from other property rights and management rights separated firms and leads to the inner difficulty in incentive mechanism designing. Especially, with the increasing of State-owned Enterprises' principal-agent level, in which acting as the principal of State-owned property , government is a institution which pursue not only the profit optization but a series of objects, the accumulative information lost appears and simultaneously the motive of property protection degraded. Furthermore, the impetus and the responsibility lackness of decision maker, the certificate and the responsibility of the incentive object, the speciality of social enviornment and the lackness of a relative objective performance evaluation standard in State-owned Enterprises makes the incentive mechanism designing more difficult.Reviewing on the basic theory and the status quo of research on the incentive of State-owned Enterprises' managers, such as the level and structure decision of the incentive of State-owned Enterprises' managers, the construction of performance evaluation system etc., we aim at building a economic incentive model which can fit our enterprises well and can provide a useful reference to the incentive of State-owned Enterprises' managers, especially to that in list company. So in this paper, we anlysis the problem in enforcing the main economic incentive method in our country, propose how to remould the incentive and restriction of State-owned Enterprises' managers system to get a equlibrium path under the external constrictions, and by combining the longterm & shortterm incentive fators, construct a datecross model based on the longterm prospection.