Research, Of Cooperation Within The Behavior And Incentives In China's Rural Cooperative Economic Organizations

This dissertation is a study on the Incentive mechanism and the farmer cooperatives behavior of the Chinese farmer cooperatives.Although both theory and practice prove that cooperation is better than no cooperation,in China the farmers still do not cooperate in reality,even some farmer cooperatives become"empty hull".Based on the perspective of evolutionary game theory,this essay analyzes the farmer's cooperation dilemma,finds the condition and mechanism of cooperation,and put forward some countermeasures for healthy development of farmer cooperatives.The basic research way,is to define the research object and its concept first,analyze its differentiation to other concepts;then to look back and combed to study on related domestic and international documents and materials;and then to make use of positive economic method and evolutionary game theory to study the creation reason,realistic will,cooperative dilemma and the evolutionary stable condition of the cooperative mechanism of Chinese farmer cooperatives;and lastly to set up incentive mechanism to improve cooperation among the farmer cooperatives.1.The contentsThis dissertation is constituted by four parts,eight chapters.Part 1:include chapter 1 and 2.This part describes the problem and reviews the documents and materials.Through analyzing the phenomenon of"empty hull"in Chinese farmer cooperatives,the dissertation describes the serious problem of no cooperation in farmers operation,and put forward the research hypothesis for farmers' cooperation behavior,and proves the great significance of this dissertation though combing the abroad and domestic farmer cooperative research.Part 2:include chapter 3,4,5.This part analyzes the contradiction between farmer's cooperative willingness and cooperative behavior.Firstly,the part proves the great significance of the existence of farmer cooperatives through both theoretic and practice analysis,which means cooperation is better than no cooperation.The part proves the farmer's great willingness and demand of cooperative organization through investigation of Chinese farmer.However,there are two dilemmas in reality,one is the cooperative dilemma caused by the farmer's opportunistic behavior and"free ride"behavior,the other is the internal control problem caused by management layer.Part 3:include chapter 6.This part finds the condition and mechanism of farmer's cooperative behavior through research way of evolutionary game theory.Firstly,the part analyzes the duplicate dynamic evolutionary game of the farmer's opportunistic behavior and"free ride"behavior, analyzes the condition of stable balance,and adds incentive and punishing mechanism to find conditions of farmer's cooperative Pareto improvement.Then,the part sets up three part game to analyze the internal control problem,analyzes the dynamic behavior between the management layer and common farmers,and adds incentive mechanism to find conditions of Pareto improvement of cooperation between management layer and common farmers. Part 4:include chapter 7,8.This part studies the incentive mechanism for farmer's cooperative behavior.The anterior study proves that incentive mechanism is the key factor to influence the farmer's cooperative behavior.This part designs the incentive mechanism based on the development environment of farmer cooperative economic organization,puts forward proposals of policies,and prospects future study.2.The study conclusions2.1 The forming of the farmer cooperatives is not only the result of the institution change but also the equilibrium of the economic subjects' behavior game.Through the analysis of the history,institution and game of Chinese farmer'cooperative movement, we conclude that the farmer cooperative is the inevitable result of the institution change,and also is the equilibrium of the economic subjects' behavior game.Firstly,with the technology improvement and the gradual division and professionalizing of labor under social production,the risk and indetermination of the market economy trades is enlarged continuously.Because of China's long-time household contract responsibility system,the small scale and scattered farmers should face the big market competition,the trade cost is high,economic performance is low.In order to share the market profits,lower the operation risk,the parting of the small farmer stimulates the demand of institution change,and the farmer cooperatives emerge.Secondly,in the process of economic behavior game,the economic subjects maximize the benefit through different strategy.The benefits of the farmer are not only decided by his own action,but also decided by other farmers' reaction. Being the production subject,the rational farmer will choose cooperative strategy to maximize personal benefits if cooperative benefits are higher than uncooperative benefits.2.2 The contradiction between the willingness and the farmer's existing behavior in Chinese farmer cooperatives.Traditional theory stands that a group consisted by individual with common benefits will take collective actions to achieve the common benefits if one is chasing to maximize his own benefit.In other words,when cooperation can bring benefit,cooperation is better than no cooperation,one will take collective action to cooperate with others.Realistic investigation data also proves that overwhelming farmers have strong cooperative willingness and demand;they expect to attend farmer cooperative to solve the numerous difficulties of current agriculture operation and to enter the agriculture market.However,there still is no cooperation phenomenon,such as opportunistic behavior,free ride behavior and internal control behavior.Such phenomenon lowers cooperative organization's performance,creates performance deviation,influences the farmer's cooperative behaviors and the development of cooperative organizations,and even causes collapse of the cooperative organization.The realistic contradiction forces us to carry on a thorough study on the farmer's cooperative behavior,and the condition of no cooperation evolving to cooperation.2.3 The farmer's cooperative behavior is a dynamic evolutionary process which decided by comprehensive performance of incentive and penalty mechanism. Through the evolutionary game analysis of cooperative behavior between farmer and farmer,and between farmer and cooperative organization,it is the incentive and penalty mechanism that help farmers change from uncooperative to cooperative.Firstly,through the study of evolutionary game behavior of the common farmers,when the comprehensive performance of cooperative incentive and free ride penalty is higher than production cost,the farmer's behavior will evolve to cooperate.In other conditions,they will either cooperate or take free ride behavior,or do not cooperate.Then the essay analyzes the farmer's cooperative behavior in different character.The dissertation sets up three parts evolutionary game model under the hypothesis of good and evil behavior,to explain the problem of internal control.The research describes that whether the manager infringe the common farmers is decided by the comparison of the good manager's lost caused by the farmers' boycott and the evil manager's penalty caused by the farmers' boycott.If the former is lower than the latter,and the initial boycott rate reaches a certain proportion,the manager will not infringe the farmer's benefit and the farmer cooperatives will reach stable.Otherwise,the manager is doomed to infringe the farmer's benefit,internal control problem exists.2.4 Design the incentive mechanism to promote the farmers' behavior evolved from uncooperative to cooperative.According to behavior theory,one's behavior is decided by his motive and demand.The external stipulation can change the demand,and then influence the behavior.The evolutionary game analysis also proves the standpoint.Therefore the farmer's behavior can be led by the combination of realistic and concealed,internal and external incentive mechanism.On the hand,the realistic incentive mechanism can be combined with concealed incentive mechanism.Realistic incentive mechanism includes property incentive,salary incentive.Concealed incentive includes reputation,social capital, ethic,and affection incentive.On the other hand,the internal incentive mechanism can be combined with the external incentive mechanism.Besides realistic incentive,internal incentive includes penalty and supervision mechanism.Besides concealed incentive,external incentive includes institution,finance,taxation supports by the government.Designing and setting up the above mechanism will coordinate farmers' behavior,stipulate them to cooperate,and achieve the stable development of the cooperatives.3.The important point of this dissertation3.1 Under the assumption of rational economic person,the farmer is a behavior subject chasing to maximize his own benefit.When cooperation is better than no cooperation,taking collective action is the best choice of the farmer.However,because of limited rationality and incomplete information, the deceitful and breaching contract behavior can not be fully supervised;the farmer can take opportunistic action,doing nothing but share the collective income.As this opportunistic behavior is learned and copied by other farmers,the altruistic behavior will vanish gradually,and everybody will be free ride opportunist,the cooperation will become"prisoner's dilemma",the cooperative willingness will be contradict to cooperative behavior.3.2 Appropriate incentive mechanisms must be introduced to promote cooperative behavior.When lack of cooperative incentive and free ride penalty,or the incentive and penalty mechanism is severely low,the most probable choice of the farmer is to take free ride behavior,and the cooperative organization will die.When the comprehensive performance of the incentive and penalty mechanism is lower than the production cost,only when the initial choice of cooperation reaches a certain proportion,there will be evolution stability with coexistence of cooperation and free ride behavior.When the comprehensive performance of the incentive and penalty mechanism is higher than the production cost,all the farmers will choose cooperative behavior.3.3 The cooperation behavior character among farmers with different character,which means cooperative behavior between manager and the common farmers is like that the manager can choose to infringe the common farmer's benefit with its information and power advantage.When the manager infringes the common farmer's benefit,the farmers always behave like"prisoner's dilemma"because they are scattered,small,and weak,and lack of information and ability.Therefore introducing infringement penalty and boycott incentive mechanism is vital to break the"prisoner's dilemma"phenomenon.When introduced infringement penalty and boycott incentive mechanism, Whether there is internal control problem in cooperative organization,which also means whether the management layer will infringe the benefits of the farmers,is decided by the comparison between the good manager's lost caused by farmers' boycott and the evil manager's penalty caused by farmers' boycott.When the former is lower than the latter,and the initial boycott rate reaches a certain proportion,the management layer will not infringe the farmer's benefit.On the contrary,the management layer will be doomed to infringe the farmer's benefit.About the farmer's strategy,if the cost of boycott is lower than the sum of the manager's infringement income and infringement penalty,and the initial boycott rate reaches a certain proportion,the farmer's behavior will evolve to boycott,and the manager's infringement behavior will be effectively suppressed.3.4 In order to lead the farmers to change from uncooperative behavior to cooperative behavior,and break the"prisoner's dilemma"situation,the effective way is to set up positive and negative incentive mechanism,improving the living environment for the farmer cooperatives through building institution,regulation,ethic,education and supportive policies system.4.The research innovationThis dissertation begins with the study of the attendances' non cooperative strategy,investigates the farmer' cooperative willingness,and analyzes the evolution of cooperative behavior,and last find the solution of the cooperative dilemma.The features and creativities are:1.Innovation of research perspective.The development of the farmers' cooperative is influenced by the economy,society,culture and legislation;the former researches were mostly on the regulation, mechanism perspective.This dissertation consider that the institution(organization) is the outcome of the human's behavior,it is more effective to find the future development trends and influence factors through the study of the behavior process of the organization's emerge,development and evolvement.2.Innovation of research method.This dissertation is based on that the behavior is an intensive intelligent process,has dynamic changing character,and is in different characters under different stipulations.Therefore,this dissertation apply the evolutionary standpoint of biology,dynamic evolutionary model and three party game models to study the farmers' behavior change,looking for the evolutionary conditions for cooperative strategy.3.Innovation of viewpoint.Based on the fact that China rural society is an"acquaintance society", the informal regulation is effective,this dissertation strengthens concealed mechanism design in incentive mechanism,embedded social capital such as reputation,convincement,ethic and affection, to inhibit the uncooperative behaviors and stipulate cooperative behaviors.