Capacity Decision And Coordination In An Inovative Product Supply Chain

Technological innovation and product innovation continue to promote world economic development and prosperity, but also make the supply chain management more complex and uncertain. Innovative products and their components often require capital-intensive production facilities, highly skilled human resources, as well as a longer leading time, which all make the capacity management ability as one of the most critical factor to the innovative product manufacturers for their long-term success. Even in stable economic environment, market demand for innovative products is also extremely fluctuant and difficult to be predicted. At the same time, the rapid development of scientific and technological innovation, short product life cycle and continual variety changes of innovative products aggravate the unpredictability of demand. In addition, the supply chain operations remodeling process from vertically integrated to horizontal integration also exacerbates the information asymmetry between supply chain members, as well as the competition of key components supply. Therefore, how to effectively carry out the capacity decision-making and to coordinate the supply chain, so as to improve supply chain performance, become the research topic and focus in this dissertation.Innovative products supply chain has just roused research interest in China. Most of researches of capacity management of innovative products supply chain only concern demand uncertainty, and based on the assumption that demand is independent of market price. In fact, the uncertainty in supply chain is come from many aspects and demand is usually under the influence of price. In this dissertation, the uncertainty factors which have an impact on supply chain capacity decision-making are divided into three types: demand uncertainty, uncertainty arising from information asymmetries and supply uncertainty. The theory and method of management, two-tier planning, game theory and particle swarm optimization are used in this research. The main body of this dissertation is divided into three parts accordingly.The first part focuses on the key features of innovative products supply chain (the limited capacity and the leadership of downstream enterprise). The basic supply chain capacity decision-making model has been established. In centralized decision-making supply chain, the existence and uniqueness of the optimal joint decision on pricing and capacity is proved in the condition of general price-sensitive demand function. The optimal market price is the decreasing function of capacity. At the same time, a simple, low implementation cost of cost-sharing contract has been designed for decentralized decision-making supply chain with symmetric information, so that the coordination can be achieved and the expected profit of the supply chain can be distributed through cost-sharing coefficient.The second part of the dissertation focuses on capacity decision-making and coordination under innovative products supply chain with asymmetric information. First of all, under asymmetric demand information, the manufacturer can prompt supplier to set up appropriate capacity with credible demand information transmission. The mandatory and voluntary obedience scenarios are analyzed respectively. It has been shown that under the weak asymmetric demand information, only manufacturer with minimum demand can maximize his profits, while the high-demand manufacturer needs to give more profits to supplier than her reservation profits in order to signal credible information to suppliers. Under the strong asymmetric demand information, the separating equilibrium of signaling game is also exists. Since the manufacturer has accurate demand forecasting, he can grab the biggest profit. The supplier can only get reservation profits at the same time. A variety of supply chain contract performances were studied under asymmetric capacity-construct cost information through numerical simulation. It is shown that wholesale price contracts and profit-sharing contract are inefficient in innovative product supply chain; fixed margin profit contract can reveal the true cost information, but less efficient; and franchising contracts can fully coordinate supply chain.In the third part of the dissertation, the impact of regional supply risk on competing supply chains has been modeled, which involves the impact of short-term tactics and long-term strategic impact. Competition game model is divided into early warning sub-game model and back-up capacity competition sub-game model. It's shown that the strategy space of two manufacturers in the back-up competition are very limited, the joint strategy has 5-zone structure. The unique Nash equilibrium in early warning competition exists. Enterprises should balance the cost of competition and the consequences of the risk, as well as consider the competitor's strategy. Basing on complex adaptive system theory and the theory of a comprehensive risk management, a comprehensive risk management framework for innovative product supply chain has been established. Through the integration of suppliers and manufacturer's risk management information system, supply chain members can take full advantage of the risk information and speed up the risk response; therefore enhance their ability to resist risks.