The Study On Information Disclosure Transparency Of Listed Companies

According to the modern enterprise theory, company is the nexus of contracts of stakeholders, which include shareholder, creditor, manager, staff, supplier, client and the public, etc. Stakeholders require company to disclose essential information to make decisions. Listed company is an important part of security market, its information disclosure influences the security market's efficency of allocating resources. So listed company needs disclose information in order to help stakeholders make corresponding decisions and guarantee the efficency of security market.Since the foundation of China's security market, there have been many fraudlent information disclosure events, for example, Qiongminyuan, Yinguangxia, etc. At the same time, information disclosure in developed countries is not perfect, Enron event,Worldcom event,etc broke out in USA, and Parmalat event broke out in Italy. These events damage the competence of investors, shake the cornerstone of security market. Now, governments are taking active methods to heighten information disclosure transparency. Although the methods are not the same, but strengthen regulation of information disclosure is the common idea.The ownership of company is focused rather than scattered, and most companies have an ultimate controlling owner. Ultimate controlling owner have important influence on information disclosure, this paper proposes an idea that study information disclosure transparency must start from the basis of ultimate controlling owner, and set a paradigm on the view of control and balance. Different kind of ultimate controlling owner has different influence on company, so we should select different way in different company. On the basis of this view, this paper classify listed company into center listed company, local listed company and private listed company, test the influence of ultimate controlling owner's control and balance on information disclosure transparency.This paper mainly includes questions as below:1. Theory analysis and appraisal of information disclosure transparency. This paper analyzes the theory basis of information disclosure, and then gives the concept of information disclosure transparency, establishes an information disclosure transparency appraisal model applying factor analysis, the result of this model is significantly related with the result of Shenzhen Security Exchange. 2. The influence of ultimate controlling owner's control on information disclosure transparency. Firstly, this paper tests the difference of information disclosure transparency with different ultimate controlling owner, and then test the influence of control right, cash flow right, divergence between control right and cash flow right, control range of ultimate controlling owner on information disclosure transparency. The result shows that information disclosure transparency of private listed company is lower than that of center listed company and local listed company; with the increase of control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of center listed company and local listed company increase significantly, and that of private listed company increase insignificantly; with the increase of divergence between control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of private listed company decrease significantly, and that of center listed company and local listed company changed insignificantly; with the increase of control range of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of local listed company and private listed company decrease signifieantly, and that of center listed company changed insignificantly.3. The influence of ultimate controlling owner's balance on information disclosure transparency. This paper tests the influence of ultimate controlling owner's balance from the aspect of shareholder, independent boarder and external auditor.This paper divides shareholders into big shareholder, institutional shareholder and small shareholder, and test the influence of shareholder on information disclosure transparency. The result shows that the influence of single big shareholder is significantly negative in private listed company and insignificant in center listed company and local listed company; the influence of the alliance of big shareholders is insignificant regardless in center listed company,local listed company and private listed company; the influence of institutional shareholder is significantly positive in local listed company and private listed company and insignificant in center listed company; the influence of the ratio of small shareholder' share who take part in the general meeting is insignificant regardless in center listed company,local listed company and private listed company, but the influence of the number of small shareholder is significantly positive in center listed company and private listed company and insignificant in local listed company. This paper tests the influence of independent boarder on the information disclosure transparency from the aspect of serve time, reward, share, meeting times, serve number, knowledge background and action. The result shows that information disclosure transparency is significantly positive related with the share and serve number, significantly negative related with the unstandard opinion expression or resignation, unrelated with other factors in center listed companies and local listed companies; information disclosure transparency is signifieantly negative related with the unstandard opinion expression or resignation, unrelated with other factors in private listed companies, .In addition, this paper also finds accounting expert's competence of finding problems in information disclosure is not significantly different from other independent boarders,but accounting experts with practical experience are more competent than other independent boarders.This paper tests the influence of CPA auditing on information disclosure transparency from the aspect of size, position and expertise. The result shows that in center listed company, audit quality of audit firm is not different; in local listed company and private listed company, small audit firms which are in same province with clients have lower audit quality than other audit firms, so they have negative influence on information disclosure transparency. In addition, local listed company and private listed company are more willing to employ lower quality audit firm than center listed company.The innovations of this paper include three points. Firstly, this paper establishes an information disclosure transparency appraisal model; secondly,this paper switches the view from manager to ultimate controlling owner, and set a paradigm on the view of control and balance; thirdly, this paper finds the probability of unstandard opinion expression or resignation of independent boarders is significantly higher when compared low information disclosure transparency with high information disclosure transparency, and accounting expert's competence of finding problems in information disclosure is not significantly different from other independent boarders,but accounting experts with practical experience are more competent than other independent boarders in finding problems of information disclosure.