Research On Coordination Mechanism Of Product Quality In Coal Supply Chain

The agents of coal supply chain have to be faced with two major problems about product quality coordination. The first problem is how to identify the agents'quality inspection believable level, and second is how to design the agents contract parameters and to choice the partners for a coal supply chain. This dissertation develops three models generally standing for the coal supply chain quality coordination mechnism which consists of an identification mechnism for coal supply chian agents'quality inspection believable level, a contract coordination mechnism between producers and a dealer, and a joint-decision mechnism for the supply chian agents quality dispute case. Moreover, the model of the coal supply chian nework agents'credit has been built to reflect the agent credit convegence and to help the dealer chioce the right agents.The details of each chapter run as follows:Chapter 1 introduces the background of this special research topic which includes coal quality pricing policy change, coal supply chain practice and development of supply chian coordination theory. Then the importance and purpose of the thesis has summarized. the definitions and characteristics of coal supply chain, and commodity quality management have been given.Chapter 2 reviews the related literatures on supply chain coordination, application of games theory in supply chain and supply chains network theory. After that, the main body of the dissertation is formed up.In chapter 3, The paper uses the cluster analysis method to mining coal quality inspection data from different agents to identify the agent behavioral characteristics. Through this identification mechsim, the coal's quality can be determined based upon the quality inspection believable level. Accordingly, the chapter is the foundation of supply chain's coordination.Chapter 4 builds a model about supply chian agents quality investment and inspection investment to maximize the expect profit of each agent. The parameters of contract between producers and a dealer have been designed through the model.Chapter 5 builds up a quality inspection game theory model among the agents in the supply chain through the function between the quality and floating price. A joint-decision mechnism has been designed to re-allocating the decision weights of the agents in the supply chain. Chapter 6 builds up a network model based on the coal supply chain network character and the network theory.Chapter 7 summaries this dissertation, presents the main result of this research, and gives out the possible research areas in the future.The main innovations of this dissertation are:The paper uses statistical method to measure the believable level of quality inspection among the agents of supply chain, using the cluster identification model to transform the random quality index to a stable quality checking behavior issue. In the condition that the coal's nature population character cannot be obtained, the cluster identification model can transform the inner quality issue to the quality recognition issue which is the quality's social attribute. This transforming is consistent with the essential requirements of commodity's quality, also can solve the quality inspection problem.(2) Based on the analysis of quality checking, quality disguise, and quality investment among the agents of supply chain using the game theory model, the paper designs the optimal contract factors which can maximize the whole supply chain's profits. In this way, the contract can help the agents to increase the quality coordination.(3) A jiont-decision mechnism has been designed to allocate decision weights and dispute cost weights.. The mechnism make sure the equilibrium strategy will convergence to the real quality level.(4) This research finds that whatever the agents'initial credit indices are, they will convergence to a constant number in the long stable network node model. In other words, if the speculating profit is smaller than the benefit of keeping the network, the agents are becoming more and more honest; if the speculating profit is larger than the benefit of keeping the network, the participants honest level is convergence to the ratio of network mantaining cost and speculating profit.