After The Cold War The American Policy Towards Russia: From Bush To Clinton

The US-Russian relations experienced a short period of honeymoon afterCold-War. During this period, US and Russia announced that they would no longerregard each other as enemy, and would build “Mature strategic partnership”. Based onthe mutual strategic partnership, the cooperation in the security domain, for exampleon nuclear disarmament and anti-nuclear weapons technology etc., was rapidly carriedout. Meanwhile, US was also keen on promoting Russia’s domestic reform ofdemocracy and marketization. But with the the NATO enlargement started by US andits intervening in CIS district affairs, the friction between Russia and the United Statesincreased gradually, and two countries began to quarrel on many regional andinternational security affairs. With Russia’s financial crisis in1998and the frequentaid funds scandals between Russia and the United States, the Russians began tosuspect whether or not the marketization reform guided by the United States and theWest meet with their national interests and the national conditions of Russia. In March1999, neglecting Russia’s opposition, US carried out airstrikes against the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, which caused the US-Russian relations to fall to the freezingpoint after the Cold War. In the meantime, the United States began to questionwhether Russia derailed the road of westernization and democratization, and revisedthe policy toward Russia, thus US-Russian relations further was weakened. Thisdissertation is committed by a comprehensive analysis on the macro-strategicobjectives and micro decision-making environment of policies toward Russia fromBush to Clinton administration, two of the presidents of the United States, trying toprovide answers to the causes of changes from the “honeymoon” to the “friction” ofUS-Russian bilateral relations. In the process of policy analysis, the author will focuson studying causes and motives of Bush and Clinton’s policy changes toward Russia,and analyze the various elements which affected the US’s diplomacy and thedevelopment of bilateral relations after the Cold War in order to define the US-Russiarelations after the Cold War more clearly.This dissertation consists of four parts, in addition to introduction and epilogue.The first chapter mainly analyses the background which “Beyond ContainmentStrategy” was put forward, the content of the strategy and its various phase changes during implementing. The author believes that “Beyond Containment Strategy”brought by Bush was a kind of passive action to respond to peace offensive byMikhail Gorbachev because the US didn’t get fully prepared for performing thisstrategy but only divided it into three phases of “tempting”,”Cooperation for a stableEurope” and”Cooperation for a stable Soviet Union”. The author gives a briefdiscussion on these three phases and points out that the essence of BeyondContainment Strategy toward Soviet Union is US’s cold war triumphalism.The second chapter mainly analyses the main motive and characters of Bush’spolicy toward Russia and that the US toward Russia policy changes in early Clintonterm. Bush’s policy toward Russia inherted the characters of conservatism andprudence; he himself embraced political realism and focused on regional security andpower balance while he was not so enthusiastic on Russian domestic democracyreform or economic aid to Russia. Clinton embraced political liberalism and hethought it was feasible, necessary and urgent for the US to intervene and aid Russiandomestic political and economic reshaping. Also the good US-Russia relationshipshelped the US with good environment for economy recovery and the restruction ofmilitary industry. So Clinton performed the “Yeltsin First” and “Russia Preference”,and this tendency made the two countries’“honeymoon” atmosphere more intense.The third chapter mainly discusses the evolution of the US-Russian relationsfrom the “honeymoon” to the “friction”, two adjustments of Clinton’s policy towardRussia and changes of positioning Russia. Clinton administration proposed the“National strategy of engagement and enlargement”, which indicated that the USentered the strategic expansion stage after the Cold war. The bright contrast betweenthe certainty of the strategic expansion of the US and uncertainty of the reform andrestructuring of Russia finally led Clinton’s adjustment of policy toward Russia.During this period, Clinton’s policy toward Russia mainly was conducted throughtransformation of Russia’s external strategic environment and continuously involvingin Russia’s internal affairs. But US’s neglect of and damage to Russia’s geopoliticalinterests, the utilitarianism on supporting Yeltsin in power and reneging on manyeconomic assistance pledges made Russia begin to question the motives of the US,resulting in the gradual excitation of the original veiled conflict, thus leading twocountries into”friction period”. Dissatisfaction with the Russian behavior changesand the voice of questioning Russia’s transition to the “derailment” contributed to the debate and further adjustment of United States policy toward Russia and led to themore weakened relations between the two countries. The author will analyze the focusof the US domestic debate plus its deep impact.Chapter Four briefly discusses the underlying causes and influencing factorswhich weaken US-Russian relations. In the author’s view, the protection ofhegemonic powers and strategic expansion tendency of US after the cold war aresystematic factors which limit two countries’ relations. The conflict betweenAmerican “Savior Mindset” and the Russian “Great Power Complex” is the culturalroots of the friction between the two countries. The paradox of U.S. policy“idealism” words and “pragmatism” choice led to the Russia’s suspicion of the U.S.real motives. Russia’s weak influence on US domestic politics and the USmultidimensional fear of Russian power are the domestic factors which restrict twocountries relations.The epilogue points out that the US should take primary responsibilities for theUS-Russian relations from the “honeymoon” to the “friction”. Its assistance to Russiawrapped with idealistic words cannot hide the long-term perspective and deepmotivation to limit and curb the rise of Russia. Since the US is to build unipolar worldand cannot equally treat Russia, the decline of US-Russian relations is inevitable.