The Reconstruction Of Our Prosecutor Management System

The existing political and management system provides prosecutors’ severely insufficient incentive, which has constituted serious constraints on prosecutors’ behavior, their social reputation and credibility of law enforcement. To solve the " incentive " issues, we need to be guided by the modern incentive theory, reconstruct the prosecutor management system, change the incentive constraints for prosecutors, effectively build the procuratorate management and procurators’ incentive based on justice and efficient governance, try the best to mobilize the enthusiasm of prosecutors, enhance the credibility of prosecution law enforcement, in order to achieve the goal of constitutional law and to meet public’s ardent expectations.We should tackle systematically the major problems of the "incentive model" in the existing management system, and should propose to eliminate the administrative management model to construct an incentive-based new model of incentive management, supplemented by supervision. We should integrate the two approaches to analyze incentive problems, propose a unified framework for a comprehensive analysis, and provide specific ideas about the complex balance of interests of prosecutors under such a framework. Such a comprehensive analytical framework effectively integrates the current research achievement and various prosecutorate reform measures of the existing management system. Co-ordinated by the complex balance of interests of prosecutors, the various reform measures and theoretical discussion are integrated into an ideological and management system with internally logical, interlocking, mutually supportive and complementary relationships. Through an comparative analysis of the American flat model and the German bureaucratic-type model, this thesis suggests that the incentive of a complex balance of interests of prosecutors in our country should be based on the prosecutors’ classification system, stick to the bureaucratic-type model overall while implementing a flattening transformation of prosecutors at the same time, to achieve the goal of cultivating professional and meritocratic prosecutors in a flat mode under the condition of the job security.Guided by the complex balance of interests incentive theory and based on the benchmark of cultivating professional and meritocratic prosecutors, we need to improve systematically the classification system of prosecutors, the prosecutor selection system, the wage system, the performance appraisal system, the promotion system, the operation management systems, the identity protection system, and building the organizational culture of prosecutors, along the main line of “participation constraint" and "incentive compatibility constraint”. We need to build systematically an integrated incentive and management system and institutions that are in line with the career characteristics and operation rules of judicial prosecutors. Such a system should be closely integrated with our practice of procuratorial reform and appropriate for the actual situation of our country.This system should be guided by the "complex balance of interests incentive theory” and based on the prosecutor classification system. It should follow primarily the flat-model of benefit distribution, take the prosecutor job security as the core, and give the internal interests incentives the priority. This system should ensure the full realization of the rights and interests of prosecutors at the institutional level, promote the stable career complacency of prosecutors, so that they can consciously resist internal and external interventions, carry forward fully their professional achievements, and fulfill their constitutional legal oversight responsibilities objectively, impartially, independently and rationally.