On The Effectiveness Of Deterrence:A Comparative Study Among Different Types

The basic research path of this article is from theoretical analysis to case study. The aim is to summarize some rules from theoretical analysis, and then test them in case study. The theory is the effectiveness of deterrence. The specific research content is about the elements influencing the effectiveness. As the hard core of national security strategy in Cold War, deterrence strategy played a central role in maintaining and converting international system at that time. After Cold War, the core position of deterrence strategy has been compromised; however, deterrence strategy itself still serves as a corner stone of security policy in major powers. For the importance of deterrence strategy, people pay more than enough attention to the construction of deterrence theory.Deterrence theory is for defining the concept of deterrence and summarizing its rules. In the theoretical analysis, the study of effectiveness has always been the major concern. Therefore, the major goal of this article is to elaborate the research achievements of deterrence study, and then summarize the influencing elements for deterrent effectiveness after learning from their approaches. After that, the next goal is to apply those elements to international reality, hoping they will be helpful for explaining the New World after Cold War. Deterrence, as a concept, is a psychological effect basing on physical coercion for a state. The defender, which has a feeling that its interest will be harmed, sends a serious threat to the challenger, asserting the challenger will suffer great loss if its aggressive actions continue. If the challenger abandons its initial intention, then the deterrence is successful. The major approaches for effectiveness study of deterrence are rationalist, cognitive-rationalist and constructivist. The levels for deterrence research include transnational level, national level and sub-national level. The article, through theoretical summarization and case study, concludes as follows:the deterrence capacity is the corner stone of deterrence effectiveness. Basing on the different physical effects of nuclear weapon and conventional weapon, they have got highly different deterrent credibility. These two kinds of deterrence- nuclear and conventional- have different calculating criteria, different influencing elements and different effects of those elements. The main elements for nuclear deterrence credibility are national status of economy and technology, state nuclear strategy, advanced strategic defense technology and nuclear weapon reverse effect; while for conventional deterrence are relative capacities, specific tactics and converting alliance relation. In recent condition of techonolgy, nuclear deterrence is not so sensible to those elements and effects. However, conventional deterrence is much more sensible to the relative power and timing.For the will of deterrence, the influencing elements for both kinds of deterrence are the same, including the interest paradox, self-deterrence effect and cheap talk. To make the will of deterrence more credible, mutual communication and learning of interests, costly signals and uncertainty by chance are needed. For the communication of deterrent information, the communication channel and perception of deterrent signals are the cornerstones. The untrustful channel and misperception of signals will result in the failure of deterrence.After the cold war, counter-proliferation, which means chasing absolute security, becomes the corner stone of American national security policy. To achieve this goal, the U.S. in some way rests its hope on the counter-proliferation deterrence. In the crisis of Syrian chemical weapon, the U.S. made its way for a successful deterrence through appropriate retaliation preparedness and will/resolve demonstration. The fact that Syria government made a final decision for abandoning the chemical weapon is a success for counter-proliferation deterrence of U.S., which roots from prudent application of deterrent elements.For policy suggestion and recommendation, the article concludes that the core role of nuclear deterrence in national security strategy could not be compromised. To achieve a success for conventional deterrence needs more prudent calculations for relative power and timing. There is a great need for alternative planning after the possible failure of conventional deterrence. The fluent communication and mutual learning between the challenger and defender has a positive effect for deterrent success.