The Power Of Institutions In Foreign Policy Making: A Comparative Study Of Ukraine And Belarus In The Post-cold War Period

The idea for this dissertation was inspired by a big puzzle of post-Soviet regionalaffairs, which stems from the foreign policy variations among the post-Soviet statesafter the Soviet demise. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet statesfound themselves facing crucial tasks of conducting independent and coherent foreignpolicy strategies with new partners. As a result, these countries have widely varied interms of defining their major regional partners and orienting their foreign policycourse towards a particular trajectory. This puzzle however, was too big to grapplewith thus, leading us to narrow down the number of countries that constitute the coreof this puzzle.Among all the post-Soviet states, foreign policy behavior of Ukraine andBelarus in the post-Cold War period stood out as the most intriguing and challengingpiece of puzzle. Ukraine pursued westward course in its foreign policy by aspiring forthe European integration, while Belarus sought to develop close ties with Russia andformer Soviet countries. What is in fact remarkable about these cases and in greatneed of explanation is this striking continuous divergence of their foreign policyorientations in the post-Cold War period. Hence, this dissertation is occupied with thefollowing question: Why did Ukraine and Belarus choose different foreign policyorientations despite their similar initial conditions? In light of certain similarities thatthese countries share, this question challenges the conventional theories that considersuch similarities to be relevant in explaining states’ motivations in pursuing aparticular foreign policy strategy. First, both Ukraine and Belarus are located betweentwo major regional powers–Russia and the EU, which implies that both “poles” ofintegration had almost an equal importance in their weighing the costs and benefitsthey might entail. Second, both countries were considered to be among the mostindustrialized, technologically advanced, and prosperous states of the Soviet Union.Moreover, Ukraine and Belarus share similar features of “Slavic identity” with Russiaand long history of being partitioned between the West and the East over the pastcenturies.What this study observes does not correspond with the existing explanationsbased on established major International Relations theories. Therefore, the presentdissertation argues that the foreign policy variation of Ukraine and Belarus is closely linked to their domestic institutions in the form of economic structures that wereinherited from the former Soviet Union as they determined the Ukrainian andBelarusian foreign policy choices after1991. By economic structure, we mean theways how the Ukrainian and Belarusian economies were arranged and ordered basedon their republican specialization, that is–the division of labor among former Sovietstates according to which every country was set out to specialize in the production ofa certain product. Thus, it predetermined the role and position of each of the Sovietrepublics within the Soviet system of “single economic complex”. By focusing on theforeign policy behavior of Ukraine and Belarus in the post-Cold War world, this studyseeks to demonstrate how the divergence in the foreign policy trajectories of thesecountries can be determined by their domestic institutions, which are deeply rooted inthe Soviet policies of organizing the economy in the past.The major IR theories cannot fully account for such variation in foreign policybehavior given that they were acting under similar initial external conditions.Structural realism would have suggested that both Ukraine and Belarus should havefollowed the similar foreign policy pattern because as the states that seek autonomy ina self-help world, they both would have ended up being in one side against apreponderant Russian regional dominance. Similarly, if they had enough incentives tobandwagon with Russia, once again, both of them would have followed the similarpattern since their structural positions and state capabilities does not differ in majorrespects.Neoliberal institutionalism would have predicted that material incentives and thepossibilities of greater gains from regional integration initiated by Russia would havepushed Ukraine and Belarus towards the post-Soviet regional integration projects andthe cooperation with Russia in particular, because the international institutionspromise to solve collective action problems by reducing the transaction costs,providing information and enforcing rules. However, only Belarus has followed theneoliberal institutionalist logic, while Ukraine has avoided engaging itself in Russia-led regional institutions.The constructivist framework would suggest the possibilities of establishing agrouping on the basis of their similar identity, distinctive culture, ethnicity, andlanguage or some sort of inter-state dynamics that would have rendered the perceptionof Ukraine and Belarus corresponding with the Russian identity. This in turn wouldhave led to the self-perception of these states as belonging to an “in group” thus, ultimately, orienting their foreign policies towards each other. No other countriesamong the post-Soviet states were better “equipped” with all the necessary conditionsfor the emergence of any organization or entity on the basis of their similar culturaltraits as these three Slavic states as Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. However, it did notresult in their foreign policy convergence.Therefore, there is a growing need to elaborate a framework that would providefull accounts for such a puzzling behavior by Ukraine and Belarus. In attempt to fillthis theoretical gap, this study seeks to elaborate a coherent framework that is capableof providing a sufficient explanation for the research question that we pose.In doing so, this dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter1is anIntroduction, which aims to present a research question and the dissertation’s mainargument by introducing a theoretical framework. It discusses the competingtheoretical explanations provided by various scholars regarding the posed question.Chapter2covers the theoretical framework based on historical institutionalism andaims at introducing the new insights to the field of IR in order to include the domesticdimension in our understanding of states’ behavior in the international arena. Chapter3is the study of the economic structure of the Soviet Union, which was intended toprovide a historical analysis of the Ukrainian and Belarusian domestic institutionalformation and evolution. Chapter4is the comparative case study of Ukraine andBelarus, which aims to demonstrate the power and role of institutions in their foreignpolicy making. Chapter5is the complementary to Chapter4, which is the case studyof establishing a Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in2010and itattempts to provide an additional case study in order to illustrate the process ofinstitutional persistence. Finally, Conclusion addresses the implications and draws theconclusions of this study.The Introduction presents the main research questions, proposes the theoreticalframework, provides a rationale behind the case selection and the time frame. It alsoreviews the previous studies and explanations and discusses the methodology of thedissertation. In the Introduction we pose the main research question: Why did Ukrainechoose Europe-oriented foreign policy despite the existing recognition that itspolitical regime would continuously be criticized by the western countries? If it wasbecause of the economic benefits the EU membership entailed, then we should takeinto account the pattern that small states would prefer to free-ride and enjoy thebenefits from following the bigger state, then why did Belarus not aspire to Europe instead of developing close ties with Russia when the latter did not provide the formerwith the opportunities of greater economic development? To answer these questionswe explore and borrow the historical institutionalist framework from comparativepolitics.By reviewing the previous studies and explanations, the present dissertationcategorizes four main groups of arguments that sought to provide a theoreticalaccount for why Ukraine and Belarus chose to pursue divergent foreign policyorientations. First group of arguments constitute the substantial part of the relatedliterature and focuses on the impact of national identity and nationalism in shaping theforeign policies of these countries. The second set of arguments underscores the roleof history and how its contested character influences the inter-state dynamics ofUkraine and Russia in particular. The third group of explanations is build around therole of individual and group interests of political and economic actors in both Ukraineand Belarus and their impact in making the foreign policy choices the way they did.The fourth group of arguments stresses the role of external factors such as the degreeof Ukrainian and Belarusian energy dependency on Russia and the ways how Russiauses its leverage towards these two countries when there is a need to resort to a certaindegree of coercion. Apart from these four groups of studies, we focus on twoparticular works by R. Abdelal and K. A. Darden as well, who are also occupied withthe similar puzzle of variation in the foreign economic policies of post-Soviet statesand post-Soviet regional economy in general. Abdelal focuses on the importance ofnationalism in making Ukrainian and Belarusian foreign economic choices. Hestresses the role of nationalists in each one of these countries and especially theirability in invoking the nation’s support for their specific foreign economic strategies.For him, the relationship between the nationalist parties and the former communistruling elite, in particular, the question of whether the nationalists were taken seriouslyby the ruling elite and let into the field where the major foreign policy decisions werebeing made. The study by Darden proposes an explanation for this puzzle based onthe argument that the ideas of ruling elite in these countries were crucial indetermining their foreign economic policy course especially in the early1990s.Darden outlines three types of economic thought that came to dominate the post-Soviet elites such as liberalism, mercantilism, and Soviet integralism. Consequently,the post-Soviet countries showed a great variation in their foreign economic policyorientations. Having reviewed related literature, this chapter discusses the growing need to the elaboration of innovative and cogent alternative explanations which wouldcontribute to fill this theoretical lacuna and the discussion on how to explain theforeign policy behavior of post-Soviet states.Thereby, the Chapter2proposes such an alternative by offering a theoreticalframework based on historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalist approach hasbeen widely applied in the comparative politics to explain the occurrence of differentpolicy variations across countries, issue areas, and across time which can be found inall aspects of human organizations based on the institutional arrangements and theirimpact. The interdisciplinary nature of historical institutionalist approach doubledwith the recent turn in IR theory to include domestic politics and decision makingfactors rendered our endeavor in incorporating domestic economic institutions notonly possible but necessary too. Apart from being the formal organizations,institutions are also referred to any form of constraint that can affect and shape humaninteraction. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on the domestic economic institutionsthat are presented and function in the form of domestic economic structure which inturn wield enormous influence within the decision making process. We concentrateour attention on the historically evolved institutions in Ukraine and Belarus thatemerged to take shape of their economic structures and its impact on their foreignpolicy choices. Such assumption is quiet suffice since it is widely accepted that thedomestic organizational entities of any kind such as economic structure, politicalsystem, military, health care system, church, constitution and so on, can be consideredas the institutions that can affect the choices of decision makers.The main assumption of historical institutionalism which is the key in ourresearch is that institutions shape and constrain preferences, goals and ultimately thebehavior of individuals and groups. One might ask: where do institutions come from?They get established mainly prompted by the contingent events at the initial stage andevolve and persist over the long periods of time to have an effect on the actors’behavior and interaction. We discuss how such institutions get created in the firstplace, how they endure and evolve and possibilities of their future change. In doing so,we resort to the concept of path-dependence which constitutes the core of thehistorical institutionalist framework. What this concept implies is that once aparticular path is selected, it can have a “lock-in” effect since the actors and decisionmakers will take into account the previous patterns along the path and adjust theirstrategies according to it. Thus, the past incentives that led to the establishment of a certain kind of institutional arrangements can have a bearing on the current events,predetermining their possible future trajectory. However, it does not just imply thathistory matters or the future is determined rather it underlines the contingent characterof such possibilities by highlighting its usefulness in our understanding of someanomalies or puzzling behavior.This study particularly focuses on the foreign policy decision making processand the impact of institutions on the preferences and objectives of the major decisionmakers. It explores the conditions under which a particular foreign policy getsselected by looking to the coalition of decision makers that consists of independentpolitical actors. It concentrates on the coalition of decision makers since it includesindependent political actors that cannot make unilateral decisions on behalf of thecoalition. In this context, institutions constrain and eventually shape the interests andgoals of various political actors by mitigating their diverging preferences. In doing so,institutions consequently, produce a unified set of preferences which, in turn, resultsin building a unified foreign policy objective that fully or partly delivers the outcomethat every political actor wants. Such a foreign policy objective triggers the selectionof a particular foreign policy choice.Chapter3heavily relies on historical accounts in tracing back how the Ukrainianand Belarusian domestic economic institutions, that is–their economic structureswere formed and evolved throughout the Soviet times and endured even after theSoviet collapse. We explore the Soviet economic thought that gave rise to theseinstitutions on the basis of Soviet integralist concept. We discuss how the underlyingnotions of this concept such as single economic complex based on planning andeconomic socialization was resulted in the creation of specialized republics in theSoviet Union. That is to say, apart from being the separate administrative territoriesbased on nationality principle, the former Soviet states also grew as the maineconomic regions that were specialized in the production of a particular product.Therefore, the division of labor among these states evolved in such a way thatproduced different economic structures in these countries that can be distinguished bythe ways how they were organized. Our historical analysis revealed that although bothUkraine and Belarus had evolved to be the highly industrialized, technologicallyadvanced countries with similar share of economic sectors, the way how theireconomies were structured and organized was entirely distinct from each otherbecause they were differently juxtaposed in the first place. It also revealed that Ukraine mainly due to its rich natural resources was set out to be relativelyindependent economy with its heavy industry that operated through its giant plantsalbeit it immensely depended on Russia in terms of fossil fuels to run those plants. Incontrast, Belarus was designed to be more dependent on Russia and the rest of theUSSR in terms of metal, energy and raw materials supply, due to its lack of naturalresources, which in turn led to the establishment of the machine-building and machineassembling economy.Chapter4examines the Ukrainian and Belarusian case studies during1991and1999to support our argument on the power of institutions in foreign policy making.The theoretical necessity of tracing back the historical causes of evolution of theireconomic structures demonstrates the differences in this respect. Therefore, Ukraineas the country with a relatively independent economic structure that had highlydeveloped industrial complex was viewed as a country which had a great economicpotential. Thus, its economic structure generated a confidence in the perception andcalculations of the relevant political actors in the sense that they could break thetraditional ties that connected to Russia and other post-Soviet countries and reorienttowards the European countries. Such a confident foreign policy calculation whichstems from the economic grounds could affect the whole range of foreign policy areas.In contrast, Belarus, the country with a relatively dependent economic structure,was seen as the country that is doomed without its traditional economic ties withRussia and the former Soviet states in order to survive. Hence, its economic structuregenerated a widely accepted notion among the major political actors that Belarus wasbetter off by preserving its traditional economic ties with Russia and the rest of theformer Soviet countries since the otherwise option based on the Ukrainian scenariowould entail its self-destruction. Such decision has encompassed the whole foreignpolicy realm, since for Belarus the preservation of former Soviet ties was deeplyconnected to its sustenance as a state.Chapter5explores the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus,and Kazakhstan in2010by focusing on the developments related to this project in2010and2011. The main rationale for doing so is the need to test whether theseinstitutions still hold power in the current foreign policy choices of Ukraine andBelarus. To that end, we focus on the official positions of each country in deciding toengage the Customs Union with its consequences. This complementary case studyalso shows that both Ukraine and Belarus repeated the same pattern of diverging foreign policy choices that they made in early1990s once again in responding to theestablishment of the Customs Union. Ukraine rejected the Russian offer of being oneof the full founding members of the Customs Union reasoning it with itsdetermination to its strategic goal that is to become the member of the EU. In contrast,Belarus enthusiastically accepted the Russian initiative and went along with theprocedures, creating a common tariff border and Customs code. Therefore, thisadditional case also supports the argument about the persistence of the institutions inwielding enormous influence on the foreign policy calculations and preferences ofthese countries.