The Research On The Remanufactured Product Producing And Selling Model

This paper investigates three models in practice which have not been studied by others. The three models are: the model that distributors engage in remanufacturing; the model that speciality stores sell remanufactured products; the model that the manufacturer plays the role of the distributor of the remanufacturer.The second chapter summarizes the exsited remanufacturing literature and devides it into four branches, and focuses on two of them which are closely to this paper. The one is to study the structure design of the closed-loop supply chain based on remanufacturing, and is extended by the third and forth chapters; the other is to study the competitive strategy of the remanufacturing market, and is extended by the fifth chapter. On the basis of the literature, we give the assumptions which apply to each model in this paper.The third chapter studies the model that the distributor engages in remanufacturing. In this model, the distributor not only collects used products in the backward channel, and sells new and remanufactured products in the forward channel, but also participates in remanufacturing activity. This paper gets the optimal pricing decision of the model when the manufacturer as the leader, the distributor as the leader and Nash game, respectively. Then, in each channel power structurer, we compare it with the model that the manufacturer engages in remanufacturing from the perspective of the price, sale volume and profit, and find that, the profit of the distributor in the former model is more than the latter and the profit of the manufacturer in the former is less than the latter, while the total profit in the former is more than the latter. In regard to this, it is practicable to acquire profit transferring mechanism for the manufacturer and the distributor, which would ensure their own profit in the former model are both more than the latter. Furthermore, using the same angle of research, we compare three different channel power structures of this model.The forth chapter studies the model that the speciality store only takes charge of selling remanufactured products. In this model, the manufacturer produces both new and remanufactured products, and it hands remanufactured products to the remanufactured products speciality store for selling. This paper gets the optimal pricing decision of the model when the manufacturer as the leader, the new product distributor as the leader and Nash game, respectively. Then, in each channel power structurer, we compare it with the model that the distributor sells the two products from the perspective of the price, sale volume and profit, and find that, the profit of the manufacturer in the former model is more than than the latter and the profit of the new product distributor is less in the former is less than the latter, while the total profit in the former is more than the latter. In regard to this, it is practicable to acquire profit transferring mechanism for the manufacturer and the new product distributor, which would ensure their own profit in the former model are both more than the latter. Furthermore, using the same angle of research, we compare three different channel power structures of this model.The fifth chapter studies the model that the remanufacturer and manufacturer collaborate in the same channel. In this model, the remanufacturer takes charge of producing remanufactured products and wholsaling them to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer takes charge of distributing remanufactured products to the market. This paper gets the optimal pricing decision of the model when the remanufacturer as the leader, the manufacturer as the leader and Nash game, respectively. Then, in each channel power structurer, we compare it with the model that the remanufacturer competes with the manufacturer from the perspective of the price, sale volume and profit, and find that, the profit of the manufacturer in the former model is more than the latter and the profit of the remanufacturer in the former is less than the latter, while the total profit in the former model is more than the latter. In regard to this, it is practicable to acquire profit transferring mechanism for the remanufacturer and the manufacturer, which would ensure their own profit in the former model are both more than the latter. Furthermore, using the same angle of research, we compare three different channel power structures of this model.