| Since the institutional reform of housing property rights became an important part of the social and economic system reforms in China, the reform development path has been destined to special development. China housing system reform has experienced a long period of development, from the public ownership of housing and property rights under the planning economic system to the public ownership of housing property rights represented by preliminary privatization of housing properties which involves selling public housing with subsidies , raising subsidies and housing cooperatives at the beginning of the reform. Then the housing system reform signified by the complete privatization of housing property, the economically affordable housing and low-rent housing system which was emphasized again recently featured by housing guarantees. All these encapsulate the mutual communication and cooperation among evolution process of China urban housing properties , domestic ,political and economic development and transformation of the national system, which provides the rich and unique institutional history changing course for the research.The choice of property right system and economic performance is very important for China urban housing safeguards. With China increasingly paying attention to the market economy, ideological obstacles for housing system development will reduce. We should not only solve the inefficiencies of the town house property rights system formed under traditional institution, but change social inequality problems caused by the original town house property rights structure due in its evolution. China’s urban housing property rights system change faces the problems of path dependency, the existing property right system itself is a preexistent restricting factor. Property right bunch theory is the main tool in this paper to understand the essence of the evolution system ,and to analyze the institutional history.In Chapters 1 and 2, this paper points out the research and analyzing method, and reviews the definition of system, property rights, as well as China’s urban housing safeguards and property right systems. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the paper explains respectively the basis of the theory and practice of the following systems: public ownership system of urban housing property , ownership system of urban property under the distribution of benefits(1949-1978), the diverse housing property rights under multivariate investments (1979-1998), and private system of urban housing property rights under market-based system (1999-2010).This paper also makes the establishment paths of housing property right systems through its various stages and summarizes economic performance of housing property right systems in its various stages. In Chapter 6, the paper adopts a three-party game model to analyze the decision-making game among three benefit-relevant parties of local government, property developers and homebuyers. The static game theory model is established to discuss the functions of the central and local governments involved in the safeguards of construction and refines the system paths under the private property rights system. In Chapter 7, this paper puts forward the conclusions , suggestions and their implications.The change of China’surban housing property rights, in addition , was also influenced by the following factors: the political systems of different historical periods, the government preferences for urban house property rights system, the degrees of rejection and accentance from different social classes and groups, incentive mechanisms which can internalize the externalities to supervision, original town house property rights beneficiary’s weighing up gains and losses in the new housing system. Through the study ,this paper finds that the change of China’s urban housing property rights system is basically mandatory, i.e., through government policies and laws. In addition, urban housing property rights system was also influenced by values, ethics, morals, habits, ideologies and other aspects.China’s housing system change with vested interest has been intervened by social classes and groups, which is characterized by path dependency. National system difference can’t be ignored when foreign research theory and experience are introduced to study China’s housing property right system. This paper puts forward from mechanisms, which include power restrictions, institutional constraints, market constraints, and legal restrictions, to normalize and resolve the management problems under the current housing property rights system. We are opposed to urban housing property rights on the basis of the egalitarianism. At the same time, the society should try to avoid relying too much on path of mere efficiency, so as to avoid leading to some problems, for example, the housing subsidizing levels, the gap between the rich and poor and the income gap. |