Dangerous Goods Transport Network Reliability Game Analysis And Mitigation System Studied

Dangerous goods are often flammable, explosive, or poisonous. Accidents like leak, catching fire or explosion of dangerous goods in transport may cause huge damage to environment and lives and properties of nearby residents. Therefore, the study on safe transport of dangerous goods has great theoretical and practical significance in protection of people’s lives and property.This thesis analyzes the reliability of transport network, and then explores the mechanism of fail of the transport network of dangerous goods. Furthermore, the five factors influencing reliability of the transport network of dangerous goods are studied, the unsafe behavior of human, physical and chemical properties of dangerous goods, unsafe conditions of machinery, environment, safety management respectively. In the end, the prophase optimization principle of transport paths is studied from the prevention perspective.In the study of dangerous goods transport, the game between the government and dangerous goods carriers is investigated. Owing to asymmetric information in the game process, achieving balance needs several games between the government and the dangerous goods carriers. The thesis designs the transport network of dangerous goods. Considering the different profit targets of the expectation risk of the government and the expectation cost of transport companies, a bi-level programming model is proposed based on the bi-level constraints of the government and the dangerous goods carriers, which is solved by using a heuristic algorithm based on non-cooperative game theory.The thesis analyzes and validates the connections and functions among the reliability game model between destroyers of dangerous goods transport network and carriers of dangerous goods, and the Stackelberg-Nash model, and the part of the cooperative game models. It shows a worst-case solution can be given that in the following non-cooperative games;(1) destroyers influence the reliability of the travel cost of the transport network of dangerous goods after they united (2) add a line in the road network, the reliability of all users’expect travel costs and travel costs have become worse paradox; then to improve the reliability of the transport work of dangerous goods through investment, I proposed a two-stage stochastic programming. The first stage is to find the transport segment of dangerous goods needs to be invested. The second stage is to determine the transport of dangerous goods road network OD pairs between the minimum traversal cost. The reliability factor of the objective function. Use the shortest path algorithm to derive the original problem into another equivalent form. By relaxing the integer restrictions on the investment variable and using the Taylor expansion, a multi-linear function is obtained, that is the marginal effectiveness of investment.In the end, the model is proposed from the perspectives of personnel evacuation, vehicle evacuation, emergency supplies scheduling optimization after accidents, and I solve the model by using relevant algorithm.