Study On Von Wright’s Philosophy Of Action

The dissertation that follows is composed mainly of discussions on von Wright’s philosophy of action. His theory contains two major parts:the one is the relation between action and causal relation, the other is on the understanding and explanation of action, which involves the relation between action and intention. The two parts are also firmly connected with the old philosophical debate of freedom and determinism, in which von Wright is a persistent defender of human freedom.Von Wright poses the interventionlist theory of causation in dealing with the relation of action and events. Two points is exposed here:first, we can’t know the causal relation without manipulation; second, we have no way to get the notion of causation without that of action. In brief, action is where the notion of causation comes from, and it is also the premise of causal knowledge. However, when it comes to the problem of freedom and determinism, an inner difficulty appears. For there is contradiction between freedom and determinism, in history of philosophy, action and causal relation generally belong to two different groups of conception. Freedom is often presupposed by action, while determinism is always bundled with causal relation. If action is necessary for causal relation, how can this contradiction be resolved? To answer this question, philosophers have two choices:compatibilism and incompatibilism. Incompatiblists suggest that since it is impossible to reconcile freedom with determinism, one of them must be illusion; to the contrary, compatibilists try to keep both concepts commeasurable. Von Wright is a compatibilist, he claims that there is no internal, irresolvable contradiction between freedom and determinism, because determinism can’t extend infinitely in time and space, we could not regard it as absolute. Since modern times, causal determinism is based on the necessity of causal relation, but such necessity cannot be extended infinitely in the chain of events. By distinguishing causal necessity from logical necessity, von Wright pointed out that determinism entailed by causal relation can only be established in a constrained sense, therefore it is a weak determinism which does not delude free action.In the development of contemporary science and philosophy, free action faces enormous challenges. Behavioral science and neuroscience are constantly claiming that freedom is illusion. Our behavior is controlled and determined by outer stimulus or by brain’s nervous system. Action and happenings are essentially the same thing, both are causally determined, so free action is only agent’s illusion. In the wake of contemporary science, mechanism revived in philosophy of mind. Based on new scientific experience, mechanism is in line with enlightenment and claims again that human is a machine. Mechanism’s way to explain action is totally different from the way of ordinary life, which gave explanation by using concepts of mind like intention, desire and aim, the view was called intentionalism. Some philosophers argue that mechanism can’t be compatible with intentionalism. Some intentionalists, especially Malcolm, reject mechanism as a conceivable model of explanation. On the other hand, some mechanists, such as Paul Churchland, treat intentionalism as an old paradigm, which should be replaced by a new paradigm called mechanism. Facing the controversy between mechanism and intentionalism, von Wright took the third way that he hopes can reconcile them again. He gives two different defenses for his compatibilism in two different periods. The first defense was given in his book Explanation and Understanding in1971, where he uses the concept of "ignorance" to back up his position. The same person can’t be observer and agent at the same time for his own performance. Action could be causally determined from the perspective of person as an observer, but as an agent, he must be unaware of the "cause", because if he knows the presence of the cause, he would not have to act. Partly because of ignorance, and partly because of our confidence for ability to act, we have enough reason to say we act. So intentionalism and mechanism doesn’t conflicts each other. Seen from different perspectives, both can be used to explain action. In the second period, von Wright’s defense deepens into the philosophy of mind:for him, the controversy roots in the confusion of two kinds of concepts. Von Wright separates physical concepts from concepts of mind. He thought that it is conceivable to reconcile intentionalism with mechanism. However, what philosophers care is the mine-body relation as a conceptual problem, instead of an empirical one. Back to conceptual problem, we’ll find that explanation offered by intentionalism have conceptual priority which make the empirical understanding possible. In this sense, some form of intentionalism is also presupposed by mechanism, and no matter how the latter develops, it will not threaten the former in principle.Concerning the understanding and explanation of action, von Wright argues for the thesis of conceptual relation. He claims that there is conceptual necessity between action and intention, which operates though human understanding. The thesis also holds that a certain intention is not necessarily followed by an appropriate action, for otherwise we could doubt whether agent really know his intention, or he is a rational man. The understanding and explanation of action should proceed in language community. And although the sole true and objective explanation is beyond our expectation, we could nonetheless always expect better ones. Von Wright’s philosophy of action answers the question of freedom and determinism on two sides. In one side, necessity contained in our notion of determinism does not exclude contingency, and saving contingency means saving the possibility of intervention, and free action as well. In another side, for von Wright, the conceptual relation embedded in the concepts of action, freedom and intention, is the basic way to understand action, without which the concept of action cannot stand. By analyzing the explanation of action, von Wright reaches his methodological parallelism. Social science and natural science are activities following different rules, which should not be confused. Object of social science is action and its method is understanding. Finally, von Wright criticizes the "unified science", and takes defense for the methodological independence of social science.