Research On Manufacturer’s Strategy Selection And Government’s Regulation Policy Under Piracy

Information product piracy is a common problem, and also an important theoreticalresearch subject. Taking the influence of the piracy on the manufacturer’s strategyselection and government regulation policy as the research subject, with the gametheory and the optimization theory of operations research as analysis tools, the thesishas established two stage game model, analyzed the game relation between themanufacturer’s strategy selection and government regulation policy from four aspectssuch as product quality, replication behavior, piracy market competition and networkexternalities, and then put forward the relevant policy suggestion.Firstly, the thesis analysis the impact of government’ regulatory policy onmanufacturers’ quality selection through the establishment of a two-stage game model,and also analysis the regulatory strategy and manufacturer’s quality decision by takingdata simulation methods. The results show that the more stringent the government’santi-piracy regulatory policies are, the higher the product quality provided by thegenuine manufacturer is. Pirated manufacturers’ the level of counterfeit is a key factorswhich the government choose regulatory policy. When the counterfeit level is low, therole of market mechanisms can effectively protect the genuine companies without theinvolvement of government forces, and the government could take no protectionpolicies. When the counterfeit level is high, the regulation of the market mechanismcannot effectively protect the genuine manufacturers. The government should takemoderate protection.Secondly, aiming at the problem that pirate products may have the same qualityand price with the genuine product in real life, a two-stage Stackelberg game modelbetween the genuine manufacturer, the pirate manufacturer and the government is built.The government’s optimal supervision policy and genuine manufacturer’s strategychoice are studied under the circumstances that social welfare is maximized. The resultindicates that the game theoretical relationship between the genuine manufacturer andgovernment’s anti-piracy efforts. As a genuine manufacturer, it is always beneficial totake anti-replication strategy. The government should encourage genuine manufacturersto reinforce their anti-replication technology and strengthen their cooperation with thegenuine manufacturer to fight against piracy.Thirdly, with a fully competitive piracy market as the background, establish two stage game model compositions of the original manufacturer, the pirate manufacturersand the government, analyses the game relation between the original manufacturer’spiracy defense strategy and government regulation policy. The result shows, thegovernment’s policy is the key to the manufacturer’s choosing piracy defense strategy inthe static condition. In dynamic conditions, the pirate manufacturer’s counterfeit level isthe key to the original manufacturer’s defense strategy and government’s punish policy.For the genuine manufacturer, taking initiative defense strategy is always beneficial.Finally, from the information product network externalities characteristics, thethesis analysis the influence of the network effect to the manufacturer’s pricing and thegovernment’s regulation policy. The result shows that network externalities will notaffect the manufacturer’s pricing decisions, but will increase the firm’s profit, consumersurplus and social welfare level. In the balanced budget constraints, the government hasno optimal regulation. Network effect will affect the implementation of government’spolicy under piracy, and increase difficulty of piracy supervision.