Research On Enterprises’ Behaviors And Low-carbon Supply Chain Contract Coordination Under Government Regulation

With the rapid development of low-carbon economy, carbon emission right as a new flowing resource has the property of value. In the global supply chain network, the traditional two-dimension trading pattern is evolving into the three-dimension trading pattern adding with the carbon emission right trade. Accordingly, the operational costs and the profit structure are changed. Consequently, some research questions come out in the field of low-carbon supply chain operation. In order to meet the challenge, the paper investigates the questions of decision about emission reduction, price-making, supply chain performance, contract coordination and so on using the game theory to construct the model. The purpose is to find out the new mechanism and law of the low-carbon supply chain management which will provide theoretical basis and practical guidance for the decision-making of the supply chain enterprises. The main research contents and innovations are as follows:1. The low-carbon supply chain concept is proposed. Under the context of environmental protection, in the light of the supply chain, green supply chain and closed-loop supply chain, the concept of low-carbon supply chain is put forward. Then we contrast the green supply chain with low-carbon supply chain and discern the differences between them. In the framework of low-carbon supply chain, the enterprises’ dynamic decisions-making are interacted with each other which should also satisfy the "social, economic and environmental" triple bottom line.2. The behaviors of enterprises under the government regulation are studied. In the process of supply chain low-carbonization, a three stage game model is constructed between the government and enterprises taking into account the government will levy the carbon tax on manufactures. In the model, the products’ low-carbon degree, consumers’ low-carbon preferences and the rate of carbon tax have been considered. In the end, a numerical case study is presented. The conclusions show that carbon tax could incentive the enterprises to reduce emission effectively.3. The supply chain coordination problems are investigated considering the environmental effectiveness. In the low-Carbonization supply chain, decision agents gradually enhance their environmental consciousness with the constraints of external factors. They consider not only profits but also the influences of the green house gases to the external environment being emitted from the production. Environmental preferences are incorporated into the traditional dyadic supply chain and the problem of supply chain coordination is being discussed when manufacturer has environmental preferences under the certain demand market. The results show that the manufacturer can set a simple wholesale price above its marginal cost to coordinate the supply chain.4. The two-part tariff contract coordination problem in the low-carbon supply chain has been argued with the fair preference. The two stage supply chain is composed of one manufacture and one retailer. The paper investigates the supply chain coordination based on a manufacturer with fairness preference provides the two-part tariff contract to a retailer. Because of the decision-makers’behaviour preference, the two-part tariff contract can’t coordinate the supply chain under some certain conditions and the supply chain performances are changed with the fair aversion degree.5. The problem of supply chain contract coordination considering fair preference is investigated under the stochastic demand. Based on the above research, we extend the general problem to the newsvendor problem. In the two-echelon supply chain, the effects to the supply chain coordination of whole-price contract, the revenue-sharing contract and the buyback contract are discussed separately in order to get a more general conclusion.