| The core of reform of the land system is the household contract responsibility system from1978, is generally regarded as the most successful rural reform in the end of20th century in China. The main achievement of this historical reform is that farmer has the right of self-production, getting profit, and dealing with the land. The improvement of productivity caused by the reform was the main reason of the continually high growth rate of the agriculture development in the beginning of reform and opening. However, with the deeper development of industrialization and urbanization, the effect of the reform has been disappearing step by step. The contradiction between highly average arrangement and modern agriculture has gradually become more and more obvious. The lowly efficient deployment of resource can not meet the need of modern agriculture any more, based on market, scale, and information. How to realize appropriate scale of management turns to be the thorny problem in the agriculture modernized progress which needs to be solved immediately. Under the premise of stable and constant land contract relations, the government should permit farmer to transfer the land use right in multiple ways, and set up a special market for it. It is practical for appropriate scale of management.Since economic transition, Chinese government has been always encouraged and supported the land use right transfer. But a large number of experiences and evidences indicate that the high tide of farmland transfer has not come with the policy. The rate of farmland transfer is low, and the transfer market is not active. Theoretically, it is perfect to realize an optimal deployment according to the price and demand, and to build a thorough farmland transfer market system. But why it failed in practice? No matter how the national law or the practice of local government is, why are the forms of farmland transfer so complicated and various? The present researches are mainly following the analytical frame of new classical economics, while these researches could hardly explain the realistic meaning of farmland transfer. Because the new classical economics pays more attention to the market balance, and ignores the transaction costs. Actually, no matter what kind of realization of a balance trading market is, it needs money. Ignorance of the cost will make the "Cost—Benefit" measurement of farmland transfer inaccurate and then get a false conclusion which will lead to the separation of theory and practice. At present, there is little research of farmland transfer from the angle of transaction costs, combining with farmer contract choices. Therefore, it is significant to study the different structures of contract from the angle of transaction costs. Although it is difficult to get the accurate amount of transaction costs, this dissertation manage to build an analytic frame which tightly combines the transaction costs, farmer contact choices, and the right to land contractual management, form the angle of farmer. Form this perspective, the dissertation will test and verify the influence of transaction costs on different choices of contract, mainly following the transaction costs economics, cooperating with the investigation of the farmer in Chengdu-Chongqing economic zone, measuring the transaction costs of farmland transfer, discussing the influence of specific and uncertain assets on transaction costs, looking for the scientific and rational arrangement and design of governing structure, with the aim of saving the transaction costs.To achieve this research goal, the dissertation has three parts. The first part is basic theory (Chapter4to7). Chapter1is brief introduction to the background, significance, target, content, means and technologies of the research. Chapter2is literature review from the angle of new classical economics and new policy economics, and obtains the entrance of the research. Chapter3builds the analytic frame, on the basic of analyzing basis concepts and, extending the meaning of the transaction costs and contract, briefly explaining the mirror effect of present theories on the research. The second part is test and verifies (Chapter4to7). Chapter4, following the Demesetz Property Rights Model (DPRM), analyze the whole progress of the Chinese farmland contractual management, with the observing data of the national rural residents and the investigation of Chengdu-Chongqing economic zone rural resident, to evaluate the development and character of farmland transfer market. Chapter5, from the basic reason of "three dimensions, three phases" of transaction costs, builds a system to showing the transaction costs of farmland transfer, with the Principal Component Analysis and Pactor Analysis. In chapter6, the dissertation verifies the influence of transaction costs on the choices of contract by Multinomial Logit Model. Chapter7, According to the investigation of the particular case of Renshou village, Yongxing village, Ande village, Huangcheng village, discusses how to save transaction costs under the particular contact structure. The third part is Chapter8, which is the conclusion of the research and inspiration of policy. As mentioned above, the conclusions are as follows:Firstly, from the investigation on system evolution of the rural land contractual management right circulation, the change is from the internalization of external motivation, and it also is a typical way of induced institutional change, which has experienced four phases of’not allowed, exception allowed, allows a small scale, comprehensive promotion’. And the different phases are also the process which the system operating efficiency enhances increasingly. Whether from external policy adjustment, or the changing of the circulation in the form of development, it is the process that both to reduce transaction costs, and also transform the traditional form to a more advanced form of large-scale circulation. The direction of reform at present is to adhere to the premise of collective land ownership. And the reform evolves along the path of division of property rights (separation of ownership and use right), clearly established ownership (identify the land right and certification), allowing flexibility market (land transfer). Secondly, from the investigation about the market development of the rural land contractual management right circulation, the speed and scale of rural land circulation showed a trend of accelerated development form the mid-1990s. Both in the national level and in the typical area, the circulation incidence is still low, the moderate management is still in the small-scale, and the land fragmentation has not been improved effectively. National level residents’survey shows that by the end of2009, the annual average per family transferred in0.68acres of arable land, more than only0.37acres in1986, and transferred out0.47acres of arable land, showing a large regional difference. Typical areas’survey shows that the overall level of average household circulation is low, only about4acres/household. Especially in some hilly areas and remote mountainous areas, the phenomenon of abandoning arable land is serious because of the constraints of the agricultural comparative effectiveness. And those areas are also at the level of informal circulation contracts, where civil, rural, short-term and random phenomenon is often among acquaintances, relatives and friendsThirdly, according to a study in the process of right to the contracted management of land circulation, On the transaction costs and the contracted management of land circulation, information search and communication costs, contract implementation costs, circulation relations, legal documents and program, farmers negotiations ability are the important factors that influence transaction cost, on the other side transaction cost of information search, business negotiation consist the major parts of the transaction costs. The analysis of roll-in and roll-out shows that10main factors have a significant influence on the right to the contracted management of land circulation of transaction costs, including information search and communication cost are the major parts of the transaction costs; Physical asset specificity, the conversion relations are on the other hand the two main factors that affects the overall transaction costs; two personal social capital factors, legal documents and procedures, have less impact on the overall transaction costs.Fourthly, on the research of the transaction cost and contract choice, according to a study from the point of the contracting parties, farmers transfer between the transaction costs are relatively small, farmer and village collective economic organization on circulation of transaction costs is relatively large. At the same time, taking land circulation as the reference, between farmers empirically transaction cost’s influence on farmers choose circulation object, research has shown that compared with farmers spontaneous circulation, information search and communication costs, contract implementation costs, state type of human capital, those facts have a negative impact on the choice of farmers’ professional cooperative organizations and enterprises; in addition, the good geographical position area is willing more easily into the enterprise, farmers and their trade is also more convenient; The more farmers to the physical assets of its own, the more increasing the cost negotiations with trading companies are. From other control variables, the relative farmer’s spontaneous circulation, family situation, there is no significant difference among the non-agricultural development; Family farmers land resources endowment, the good, the more likely they choose corporate transactions. In the aspect of policy factors, Due to the village collective restrictions on transfers of land, the peasants are more specialized to cooperate with organizations and farmers are more willing to choose trading enterprises. On price factors, in order to obtain a higher price, farmers are more willing to choose deal with farmers’ professional cooperative organizations and enterprises.For the transaction type, transaction costs of substantial rouge are relatively small, rental fee is relatively large. At the same time, share cooperation as the reference, the analysis of the effect of transaction costs for farmers choose circulation type, the results show that, relative to the joint-stock cooperative relations, the flow, legal documents and procedures, farmers negotiating skills have a negative impact on personal social capital for peasant households to choose subcontract, transfer, swaps, rent, assistant plough land circulation type; State type of human capital of farmers have positive influence on choosing to subcontract, transferring, exchanging, renting, assistant plough type; Contract execution cost has a negative effect on farmers choose to swap; Information search and communication cost have positive effects on farmers choose subcontracting and rent, has a negative effect on farmers choose to swap. All above suggesting that the more rigorous legal documents and procedures are, the more farmers get social capital, the more bargaining ability is, the more tend to choose more formal joint-stock cooperative organization program:the stronger to choose the ability to land to farm, prefer to choose subcontracting, swaps, assistant plough forms and so on.From other control variables, compare to the stock cooperation, family non-farm development situation prompted farmers choose assistant plough; the influence of Household land resources endowment of farmers choose type is not significant. On Policy factors, the village collective restrictions on farmers flow will lead to more farmers choose cooperation. In terms of price factors, farmers in order to obtain a higher price, more willing to choose to rent, and not willing to choose low price transfer and swap.Fifthly, the typical case study of transaction cost and contract structure found that spontaneous flow relative to farmers,’leading enterprise and peasant household","sharing cooperation, cooperative association and peasant household’, land leasing, land contract arrangement such as Banks, played a positive role in saving transaction cost. At this stage but at the same time, on the practice of the rural land circulation, there is no one model which exists alone, usually a pattern and other patterns is supplement with each other, in order to save transaction cost, reduce the risk of default so as to match the contract governance structure is more stable.Based on the above research results, the article starting from the governance structure of lower transaction costs, provided some policy implications on the stage for the future promote effectively the right to the contracted management of land circulation and the realization of the moderate scale management of land, and, including strengthening land property rights, reduce the uncertainty of trading:Improved circulation service, reducing land trading frequency; Improved as a whole, weaken the land safeguard function; Strengthening mechanism innovation, and promote various forms of circulation. The main creative points in this article are as follows. The first, analysis of transfer of land use rights by combing transaction expenses and contract option based on the peasant household, this is an improvement for the theory. Secondly, quantitative measured according to the three periods of transaction expenses. And inspect the impact of assets specificity and uncertainty of transaction to transaction expenses from the three based characteristics. Thirdly, using comparative institutional analysis method, empirical analysis how the contract option of peasant households influence transaction expenses. Fourthly, to discuss how to save the transaction expenses though different contract using case study. The conclusion of the whole research is to adopt the shareholding co-operative system, which will improve the land use transfer. |
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