A Study On Differential Game Model Of Investment Of The Supply Chain

A complete chain of supply consists of many nodes. Enterprises from different nodes form a vertical relation while those from the same nodes form a horizontal relation of supply chain. To enhance vertical cooperation and weaken horizontal competition is a key point of a supply chain to succeed. Since members of a supply chain are independent enterprises who all aim at maximizing their benefit, this often deviates and even violates the group benefit of the supply chain. Therefore coordination measures are needed to ensure the supply chain to optimize successfully. In this thesis, we consider two types of investment:advertisement and research and development (R&D for short). By constructing related differential gaming model, we study dynamic investment cooperation of the supply chain and the corresponding channel coordination measures. The main Innovations of this thesis are as follows:We studies the contract coordination problem of the supply chain system composed of a suppler and a retailer with a random exponential demand. The supply chain contract is used to eliminate the ineffective bilateral effect caused by transaction cost at the nodes. The result shows that under the contract of sharing the benefit and cost, the efficiency of independent channel decision can infinitely approach one hundred percent. But the improvement of channel efficiency has to sacrifice the benefit of the weaker side of gaming as the cost. The core enterprises may improve the channel efficiency by means of non-coordination such as coercing to sign unfair contracts, or by coordination to reallocate the profit increment of channels so as to attain one hundred percent channel efficiency.We discusses the problem of advertisement battle of duopoly between two manufacturers with product replacement effect. In the ads battle, competition ads are used to weaken the brands reputation of the rival, and information ads are used to strengthen his own brands reputation. For manufacturers with symmetry, we analyze the influence of ads parameters like efficiency, natural decay rate and discount on the stability policy of ads battle; for manufacturers without symmetry, as those occupying the advantage of efficiency and cost will take the attack policy while those with disadvantage on the above aspects will take the defense policy, we analyze further how to keep the balance between the attacker and the defender when the advantage increases. A differential gaming model on the product ads cooperation between the manufacturer and the retailer is constructed, where the brands reputation of product determines the capacity of market and the demands are determined by the capacity of market and the effect of ads. The study shows that:(ⅰ) Compared with the decision of virtual integration, there exists the phenomenon of rider in the ads investment in independent decision, resulting in the decrease of channel efficiency,(ⅱ) There are two types of riders. One type is that there exists an enterprise with obvious advantage on efficiency and cost, so the disadvantageous enterprise is the only rider; the other type is that there is no enterprise with obvious advantage, so they are mutual riders,(ⅲ) For the first type of rider, since the improvement of channel efficiency will sacrifice the benefit of the disadvantageous enterprise, the core (advantageous) enterprise can make the channel coordination by compensating the disadvantageous enterprise; for the second type of rider, since the improvement of channel efficiency will increase the profit of both sides at the same time, bilateral excitation policy can be set to make channels to attain one hundred percent efficiency.On the basis of the manufacturer advertising and products of retailers having diffusion effect, we construct a cooperative gaming model between a manufacture and N retailers. In this basic differential gaming model, brands reputation is determined by the advertisement of the manufacture and the sales of retailers, and the price of the product is determined by the brands reputation and sales via the inverse demand function. The basi model is studied as follows:(ⅰ) We initiate the study of differential gaming from the angle of asymmetric information in the supply chain, and point out that there are many other balances besides the open ring, closed ring equilibrium in the strict sense, thus expanding the objects available for analysis,(ⅱ) Three interesting equilibriums are selected from the basic model, i.e. conservative, open and closed equilibrium of which discussions are made on the value of information. The method of determining the best equilibrium and the measures to be taken for this chosen equilibrium is obtained for the core enterprise,(ⅲ) We discuss the alliance behavior of retailers with the asymmetric information. On different diffusion effects, the alliance behavior of retailers may aggravate or alleviate the horizontal competition of supply chain,(ⅳ) Two special examples of channels integration in the basic model when sales or price is fixed are discussed, showing that if the sales is fixed in any of the above-mentioned equilibrium, the integration policy can improve the equilibrium in the sense of Pareto. The feasibility of the stability policy of integration in these two special examples is analyzed on the moral hazard and regulatory cost. Next, remove the diffusion effect of products in the basic model and consider the promotion advertisement of retailers. The promotion ads have two effects. The first one is the same as that of ads of manufacturer, affecting the brands reputation of products; the second one is different, making the products diverse. Our research shows that if the promotion affects brands reputation, the manufacturer is the rider obviously, and if the promotion leads to diversity, then the manufacturer can only be the rider in particular cases.A nonlinear differential gaming model on the cooperative research and development (R&D) between a manufacturer and N retailers is constructed. The R&D of reducing the cost of parts of products, channels have two models of R&D, i.e. the manufacturer alone and the cooperation between the manufacturer and supplier. We have the following results:(ⅰ) Determining the conditions on the existence of saddle points of channel gaming in two R&D models, hence determining whether there exists a stable equilibrium in the cooperative gaming between the manufacturer and the suppler. Concretely, cooperative R&D acquires stable equilibrium more easily than independent R&D.(ⅱ) For various parameters in the model, comparing and making a static analysis on the R&D of the manufacturer and the suppler, and the stability expression of production cost at the saddle points. A discussion is made on the sides of Arrow and Schumpeter take in the famous debate on whether monopoly is beneficial to the progress of technology,(ⅲ) Analyzing qualitatively on the problem of mode choice in R&D. Instructive suggestions on the channel coordination of this problem are given.