Study On Low Carbon Supply Chain Decisions And Coordination With Behavioral Factors Consideration

With the rapid development of industrialization and urbanization,environmental damage and pollution become more and more serious,greenhouse gas emissions seriously exceeded,environmental problems are increasingly serious.Controlling and reducing carbon emissions become an urgent need to be solved the key issues.Under the background of increasing emphasis on environmental protection and sustainable development,due to government regulation,the pressure of international carbon emissions and the consumers' gradually enhancing low-carbon preferences,in order to improve their core competitiveness and to win a sustained competitive advantage,manufacturing enterprises should to actively assume environmental responsibility,take measures to actively participate in the construction of low-carbon supply chain operations.On the other hand,empirical analysis and investigation found that under the assumption of complete rational human condition,a large deviation exists between the supply chain research and the practice.On this basis,the behavior of the operation and management has been rapid development.In these backgrounds,this paper takes the low carbon supply chain as the study object,and uses the theoretical research,mathematical modeling,system simulation and data analysis to study the impact of members' fairness concern,risk avoidance and altruistic preference for low carbon supply chain pricing strategies,level of carbon emission reduction and the profits.(1)Considering the manufacturer's fairness concern,we study the impact of fairness concern and low-carbon preference on supply chain decision-making respectively under the policy of manufacturer independent emission reduction and government carbon tax.Then we build three decision-making models,a centralized decision-making model,a manufacturer fairness neutral decentralized decision-making model and a manufacturer fairness concern decentralized decision-making model.At the same time,numerical analysis is used to verify the impact of fairness concern and consumption of low-carbon preference on low-carbon supply chain pricing strategy,product carbon emission reduction,profit of supply chain members and whole profit of supply chain.The results show that: in the centralized decision model,the level of carbon emission reduction and the whole profit of the supply chain are higher than the decentralized decision models.The objective concern of the manufacturer's fairness concern will further reduce the level of carbon emission reductions and the whole profitability of the supply chain.And with the increases of manufacturer's fairness concern,the profit of the supply chain members and the whole supply chain will be reduced,but the share of the total profit of the supply chain is increasing;in the manufacturer's independent emission reduction strategy,low carbon product retail price,carbon emission reduction and supply chain profits in three different supply chain decision-making model will increase with the increase of the carbon coefficient,the carbon emission reduction rate of the product increases with the increase of the carbon tax rate and decreases with the increase of the degree of fair concern,but in the government carbon tax policy,the retail price of the product are determined by the carbon coefficient and the carbon tax rate.Under different policies,the implementation of the carbon cost reduction contract can promote the demand of low-carbon products and reduce the retail price,so as to effectively improve the low-carbon supply chain overall efficiency.(2)Under the carbon tax policy,we build a low carbon supply chain model.Then,the paper study the impact of the carbon tax rate and the manufacturer risk aversion attribute on low carbon supply chain pricing strategy,carbon emission reduction level,profit of supply chain members and the overall profit of the supply chain by using numerical experiments and the game theory.The results show that: under the carbon tax policy,the carbon emission reduction level and supply chain profit are affected by the carbon tax rate.Under the centralized decision model,the carbon emission reduction level of the product and the overall profit of the supply chain are higher than the decentralized decision making,further,manufacturer risk of the manufacturer's profit and the overall profit of the supply chain will be reduced,but the trend of the retailer's profit will be reduced by the carbon risk,and the profitability of the retailer will be reduced by the increase of the risk of the manufacturer.When the cost sharing coefficient within a specially,the implementation of carbon emission reduction cost sharing contract can promote the demand for low-carbon products and improve the level of carbon emission reduction products,which can effectively improve the low-carbon supply chain Overall efficiency.(3)Under the carbon cap and trade policy,the two stage low-carbon supply chain modeling analysis.respectively,the centralized,fully self-interest,retail altruistic,manufacturers altruistic and completely altruistic five different low-carbon supply chain decision-making model to study the effects of carbon trading price and altruistic preference on low-carbon supply chain pricing strategies,carbon emission reductions,profit of supply chain members and whole profit of the supply chain.And then use the numerical examples to analyze the influence of altruistic preference on the decision of supply chain.The results show that: retailers' and manufacturers' altruistic preferences were able to increase the level of carbon emission reductions,and as the decision maker's altruistic preference increased,the level of carbon emission reductions infinitely approach carbon emission reductions under centralized decision-making;supply chain members' altruistic preferences will reduce their own profits,but the profits of the other members of the supply chain will increase,as same as the overall efficiency of the supply chain.Regardless of whether the manufacturer(retailer)has a spoil preference,the manufacturer(retailer)is more willing to cooperate with the hereditary retailer(manufacturer).