Research On Model And Algorithm For Aircraft Pushback Slot Allocation Under Market Mechanism

With the vigorous development of air transportation,the air transportation demand has increased obviously.Airport capacity is close to saturation,especially during rush hour,congestion and delays are problems that occur routinely at domestic and international airports and not only reduce the operational efficiency but also result in huge losses to the airlines.In order to solve these problems,scholars mainly focus on the optimization of taxiing path,prediction of take-off queuing.Few studies based on the aircraft pushback management.With the aircraft pushback management as object,this paper establishes an aircraft pushback slot allocation model to optimize the pushback sequence and time,analyzes the game relations between the airport and the airline in the process of aircraft pushback slot allocation,and explores the effect of the price strategy on aircraft pushback slot allocation under market mechanism.In the aspect of fundamental theory of aircraft pushback slot resource allocation,the precise definition of aircraft pushback slot and aircraft pushback slot resource are given,the characteristics of airport surface taxiing capacity and the internal relationship between taxiing capacity and pushback slot are analyzed.Then the concept of elastic taxiing capacity is put forward after the interval value assumption of taxiing capacity,the threshold of taxiing capacity and measurement of effective pushback slot are also discussed.After that the process of aircraft pushback decision based on elastic taxiing capacity is designed.In order to reflect the decision-making ability of the airport and airline,on the basis of mathematical description of effectiveness,efficiency,equity of pushback slot allocation and the analysis of aircraft surface cost,an aircraft pushback slot allocation model for minimizing the total surface cost is established.An improved discrete differential evolution algorithm(IDDE)is also designed.The problem of aircraft pushback slot pricing is analyzed from the perspectives of congestion pricing as well as non-cooperative game.From the perspective of the compensation for the downgrading of surface service,the concept and quantitative study of the “external cost of surface congestion” is proposed,and it is used to determine the price of aircraft pushback slot.Aircraft pushback slot congestion pricing models based on demand concentration and surface cost are established.Aircraft pushback slot congestion pricing models based on demand concentration performs difference pricing according to the value of demand concentration,can reflect the influence of different pushback demand intensity on resource pricing;aircraft pushback slot congestion pricing models based on surface cost considers slot price variable in the design of objective function,aims at the lowest surface cost of all aircrafts,can reflect the participation of the airline.An improved discrete differential evolution algorithm is put forward.Then from the perspective of non-cooperative game,a pushback slot allocation based on stackelberg game under market mechanism is established,and the existence of pushback slot pricing Nash equilibrium is proved.In the research of the complete information dynamic game,the backward induction solution is proposed.For the incomplete information dynamic game,the game model is updated,and the iterative algorithm based on marginal utility is put forward.This part proves the effectiveness of game theory in aircraft pushback slot pricing.In order to describe the inter-behavior between the airport and the airline in the process of aircraft pushback slot allocation,a non-cooperative game model for aircraft pushback slot allocation under market mechanism is established.By using bi-level programming theory,and according to different price strategy,this stackelberg game model is further extended to the aircraft pushback slot allocation bi-level programming model under non-pricing strategy,demand concentration pricing strategy,surface cost pricing strategy.An improved artificial fish algorithm(IAFSA)is proposed.Then the applicability of each pushback allocation model is determined through the application research on Xinzheng international airport.Application results shows that the implement of price strategy can effectively adjusted aircraft pushback demand in rush hour,balance the surface cost of the airline and alleviate airport surface congestion.This paper follows the whole research idea of "theoretical study,simulation verification and application analysis",studies the aircraft pushback slot allocation model and algorithm which considering different circumstance,decision-makers and optimization objectives under market mechanism.The main research objective of this paper is to optimize aircraft pushback management,improve airport scene operation and scheduling system.This research provides a fresh idea for the optimization of aircraft pushback decision,provide reference for airport management department to formulate effective aircraft pushback strategy and scientific and reasonable scene operation and scheduling scheme,and is of great significance to establish aircraft pushback management system which more suitable for market mechanism.