Research On Environmental Responsibility System Change Of Chinese Government

Since the ninth five year plan,under the condition of the Chinese economy sustained growth in total,environmental pollution and ecological destruction have increased,and environmental problem has become an important factor influencing economic development,social stability and people health.In order to contain the gradual deterioration of environment,our country has established the goal of reducing total discharge of major pollutants.The Chinese government will implement target layers to the place,and uses the longitudinal accountability for the implementation of the target responsibility.Because government environmental responsibility boundary is fuzzy,the behavior of local governments and related departments often wander in the edge of the rules,which causes its lack of rite and the inadequate seriously hindered the development of our environmental protection career.Therefore,the government environmental responsibility system is involved in pollution treatment as a tool of regulation officially,which is to make a positive response of ecological environment deterioration in our country.This study attempts to grasp the current status of the Chinese government environmental responsibility system accurately,comb and analyze the process and characteristics of the Chinese government environmental responsibility system change after the 1980s,trying to find the regularity of government environmental responsibility system change,reveal the gene and motivation of government environmental responsibility system change,and put forward the ideas of reform of governmental environmental responsibility system.As the beginning of this study,we firstly introduce the background of the selected topic,the significance of topic selection,on this basis we put forward questions about reform of government environmental responsibility.Then we review and comment on the existing research progress,mainly around the government environmental responsibility system definition,the analysis of motives of government environmental responsibility system reform,the analysis of the main body's behavior,and the discussion of reform program.We define the basic concept at first in this chapter,such as system,system environment,system change,and we comb the relationship of the system environment,the system arrangement and the system structure,and the relationship between the system change and the system evolution.On this basis we focus on interpreting the motivation of system change,process and path.and then we card and describe the Chinese government environmental responsibility system change process and the characteristics of the present system after the 1980s,clear the starting point of reform of Chinese government environmental responsibility system,and mainly conduct the economic analysis on the Chinese government environmental responsibility system change by using the theory of system change.This study finds that the external profit is the source of power of the Chinese government responsibility system change.The Chinese government environmental responsibility system change is the result of repeated games between related interest groups for chasing external profits,which has the characteristic of path dependence.we use game model to analyze the logic and the game process of different interest groups' environmental behavior,and conduct equilibrium solutions on games between local governments under the central government's accountability,games between environmental protection departments and local governments,and games between the public and the local government in turn.On the other hand,we describe and analyze the historical changes of Taihu Lake environmental responsibility system,and then on this basis,we systematically summarize the innovation of Taihu Lake environmental responsibility system,which provides guidance for the reform of Chinese government environmental responsibility system.Finally,we illustrate the idea of reforming Chinese government environmental responsibility system,around main components of Chinese government environmental responsibility system,such as responsibility subject,responsibility configuration,and the supervision and investigation of responsibility.The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follows:Firstly,the system is a series of contracts or rules that constrain specific economic subjects' activities and relationships concluded by people's repeated games in certain circumstances.It is a self-sustaining and dynamic-change system.System environment changes will change potential costs and benefits of the existing system,and produce external profits.However,external profit is a necessary condition for system change.Only parties get the cognition of the external profit,and participate in the net income maximization received from system change,may they launch system change.And the final path of system change depends on interests of the coupling degree between various interest groups and their power relations.Secondly,as China's economic transformation from extensive growth to sustainable development,the environmental problem has become the obstacle of restricting healthy development of China's economy and society.However,the germination of environmental democracy consciousness and the concept infiltration of responsible government not only provide power for breaking barriers,but also express the direction for Chinese government environmental responsibility system change.The process of Chinese government environmental responsibility system change is the process of Chinese government trying to solve China environmental problems.The Chinese government environmental responsibility system change has obvious characteristics of path dependence.Thirdly,Chinese government environmental responsibility system is constantly changing.Liability subject and the establishment of main body responsibility gradually are transformed from the priority of policy guarantee to the priority of legislation safeguard by modifying and supplementing legislation.The environmental responsibility allocation is focused on transforming from the environmental responsibility of the central government to the environmental responsibility of local governments and environmental protection departments,and begin to pay close attention to the responsibility of the government as a representative of the ownership of the resources.Environmental responsibility supervision and accountability are gradually transformed from the supervision and investigation of the related responsible persons to the supervision and investigation of the government itself,and the main body of accountability is gradually extended to the judicial authority,the authority and the social public from the administrative organ.But the current government environmental responsibility system still doesn't clear the main responsibility body,lack and blur main body's responsibilities,fail to balance justice and efficiency in responsibility allocation standard,as well as keep the absence of allograft oversight and accountability.Fourthly,whether the Chinese government environmental responsibility system change can be successful mainly lies in whether it can satisfy the interests of relevant parties.The central government is usually a primary action group,and coordinating and guiding the cognition of participants and action rules dominates the reform of government environmental responsibility system.Local governments at various levels are not only the secondary action groups of government environmental responsibility system change,but also promote the diversification of system change through its own innovation.Environmental protection departments are always secondary action groups of the government environmental responsibility system change,for reasons of self-interest maximization they will adjust their behavior and find the equilibrium which is consistent with the interests of local governments.Public participation is the optimization of the government dominant structure in the field of environmental protection.Therefore,the Chinese government environmental responsibility system change is essentially the game between the government and the public,both of which are as the leading core interest groups,and the two major interest groups have enough power to promote the further development of reform of government environmental responsibility system.Fifthly,environmental behaviors between different interest groups exist game relations.Since environmental policy is implemented by local governments,environmental behaviors of local governments directly influence the whole country's environmental quality.The central government emphasizes the local government accountability,increases the proportion of environmental protection index in the local government achievements appraisal system,and decrease the cost of local government performance of environmental responsibility,which can promote different local governments in the area to choose environmental protection strategy jointly;To change the dual leadership system of local environmental protection department,and to clear responsibility body and main body's responsibility,can effectively improve the environmental governance performance;Improving the public environmental protection consciousness,cultivating the society force of environmental protection,and making the social public become the main body of environmental supervision and accountability,can effectively promote the performance of government environmental responsibility.Finally,how to determine the government environmental responsibility in administrative areas scientifically and fairly,is not only related to the establishment of environmental responsibility allocation standard,but also an important problem need to be solved in our government environmental responsibility system reform.In this study,we understand the regional government environmental responsibility as the regional emissions allocated.On the basis of meeting the fairness between administrative areas,considering the target of optimal economy(efficiency),scientifically configurating the target emissions in each administrative region,are considered as quantitative environmental liability of each administrative region,thus the problem of government environmental responsibility allocation standard can be effectively solved.