Study On The Insurance Behaviors Of The Forestry Managers

Portecting and developing the forestry resources is not only important to the construction of ecological civilization and dealing with the changes of global climate, but also to the development of the forest district economy. However, great riskes are with the process of operating and managing the forestry. As one of the means of risk management, forestry insurance has the advantage of avoiding and dispersing the riskes and is the important means for the forestry managers to disperse the riskes, compared with the others. Developing the forestry insurance will reduce the risks of operating and managing the forestry, smooth the annual revenue to avoid changing radically. Since 2003, after a new reform of the collective forest property right system, forestry insurance is still viewed as the important supporting system for deepening the reform of cellective forest property right system, and is beneficial to enhance the ability of resources allocation. However, forestry insurance has been not walked out the dilemma of low independent insured rate and low insurance rate.This paper will investigate internal economic mechanism of forestry insurance falling into the dilemma in China in view of the insured, and will focus on the risk attitude, purchase-willingness, willingness-to-pay, attitude to the financial subsidy and the behaviors law under the conditions of limited rationality and information asymmetry. To deepen the discussion these topics, the probility of different the managing bodies influencing the insurance behaviors will be considered. The bodies of forestry managers will be classified into three classes:enterprise of forestry cultivation, specialized households of forestry cultivation and part-time farmers. Based on the classification, the insurance behaviors law of the different bodies will be disscussed respectively, and their differences of the insurance behaviors will be discussed comparatively. This research will provide a new angle of view to understand the forstry insurance market, and will lay a foundation for insurance company to design the insurance business again and for the government to define the optimal intervention boundary and enhance the efficiency of governmental intervention of the forestry insurance market.On the basis of scientific classification of the forestry managers, this paper will study on the risk attitude, purchase-willingness, willingness-to-pay, attitude to the financial subsidy and their differences by the means of questionnaire and econometrics model, and disscuss the behavior law and strategy selection in evolution under the condition of the limited rationality and the information asymmetry in order to lay a substantial and scientific foundation for making the forestry insruance policies. This is the total target of this paper. There are ten parts in this paper totally. The specific content is as follows:One:Scientific classification the forestry managersUsing the principles of economics, the theory of organization behavior and farmer behavior and combined with the actual production of forestry, the forestry managers will be scientificly classified into three classes:enterprise of forestry cultivation, specialized households of forestry cultivation and part-time farmers, according to differences of planting scale, operating ability, risk attitude, the degree of rationality, labor force employment, the degree of dependence on the forestry income.Two:Study on the risk attitude of forestry managersOn the basis of scientific classification, the degree of risk attitude of the forestry managers will be determined according to the method and theory of risk attitude determination. Some conclusions can be gotten:enterprise of forestry cultivation and specialized households of forestry cultivation belong to the risk aversion, but the degree of aversion of enterprise is more serious than the specialized households, and part-time farmers belongs to risk seeking. Then this paper will empricially study on the influencing factors of risk attitude. The enterprises are mainly affected by the factors as age, education, nature of ownership, whether knowledge of the forestry insurance or not, etc; specialized households are mainly affected by the factors as age, the number of the elderly and the students raised, the years of cultivation the forestry, the influence degree of the surrounding group, etc.Three:purchase-willingness and willingness-to-pay of the forestry insurancePurchase-willingness mainly measures the degree of willingness of purchasing the forestry insurance under the present insurance price, while willingness-to-pay mainly measures the level of pay the forestry insurance under the constraint conditions such as income.The questionnaire survey shows that 79.1% enterprises are willing to purchase the forestry insurance,76.14% the specialized households, and 11.17% the farmers. The purchase-willingness of the farmers is the lowest of the three classes. Analysis by the logit model shows that the purchase-willingness of enterprise mainly affected by the factors as the insurance price and risk attitude, while specialized households and the farmers are mainly affected by the factors such as the insurance price, risk attitude, risk awareness, and so on. The main reasones of unwillingness to purchase the forestry insurance for the enterprise and specialized households are high price, low level of insurance, difficulties of rights claim, distrust on the insurance company and taking the risk by themselves. However, except the above reasons,88.36% the farmers claim that they never heard of the forestry insurance.The highest level of willing-to-pay can be gotten through the three choices with open-ended followed up elicitation method. The suvey shows that the enterprises WTP is 2.09 dollars per Mu averagely, the specialized households 1.64, the farmers 0.28. Analysis by the logit model shows that the WTP of enterprise mainly affected by the factors of risk attitude, the specialized households by whether knowledge of the forestry insurance or not, the farmers by risk attitude and whether knowledge of the forestry insurance or not.Four:the influence on the insurance behavior by the policy of financial subsidyThe information asymmetry, speciality and complexity of the forestry insurance market are responsible for the market failure. Analysis from the perspective of the game theory shows that the forestry insurance belongs to the policy nature and it need the substantial spport from the government. The questionnaire survey shows that the present insurance price acquires the high approval from the enterprises and the specialized households, while the farmers disapprove the present insurance price. Meanwhile, all operating bodies agree that the rate of the financial subsidy is too low, and it should be raised.Five:Study on the insurance behavior under the condition of limited rationalityAccording to the difference of the degree of rationality, the enterprise and the specialized households belong to the higher level of rationality, while the farmers belong to the lower level. Basis on the knowledge of the difference rationality, the mechanism of the best-response dynamics will be used to analyze the insurance behavior of the enterprise and the specialized households, while the mechanism of the replicator dynamics will be used to analyzed the insurance behavior of the farmers. Analysis shows that the difference of the rationality will influence the insurance behaviors and the system of selecting the forestry insurance by themselves will lack of the efficiency, and the intervention from the government is necessary. This conclusion shows that the forestry insurance belongs to the policy nature from another aspect.Six:Study on the insurance behavior under information asymmetryThe phenomenon of information asymmetry not only inhibits the forestry insurance willingness, but also inhibits the supply willingness of the foresrty insurance. Using the game theory and information economics, the reverse selection of the forestry insurance market will be analyzed. Analysis shows that the financial subsidy is a good way to reduce the reverse selection. Meanwhile, the clauses of Deductible and Coinsurance will be provided to reduce the moral hazard of the forestry inruance.