Research On Optimization And Coordination Of Supply Chains For Deteriorating Items Under Carbon Emission Regulations

Under the background of low carbon economy, different types of carbon emission regulations have been adopted to curb and reduce the carbon emission. As a consequence, the goal and decision making process of enterprises and supply chains have been changed by these carbon regulations. On the other hand, due to the physical properties of deterioration, deteriorating items such as raw food have brought new challenges to the supply chain management. Based on this real implication background and challenges, this dissertation uses quantitative analysis methods including convex optimization, game theory, contract theory and numerical analysis, etc, to analyze the operational management for deteriorating items. Moreover, this dissertation considers the joint pricing and inventory control model for deteriorating items with multi-channel distribution system under carbon tax regulation and the two-echelon supply chain coordination for deteriorating items under different carbon regulations. The main research contents are summarized as follows:This dissertation firstly constructs the joint pricing and inventory control model for deteriorating items with multi-channel distribution system under carbon tax regulation based on the raw food electronic commerce. Using convex optimization method, this dissertation analyzes some optimal properties of the objective function and designs an effective algorithm to solve the optimal joint pricing and inventory decisions. This dissertation further uses several numerical examples to study the effect of carbon tax on the optimal profit and carbon emissions.Secondly, this dissertation extends the sinlge firm to two-echelon supply chain systems and studies the effects of carbon emission regulations on the optimization decisions of supply chains for deteriorating items. On the one hand, this dissertation develops the inventory models for the two-echelon supply chain with deteriorating items under carbon cap-and-trade and tax regulations. In the considered supply chain system, the warehouse of the retailer has a limited storage capacity, the selling price varies with the time and carbon emissions are generated from the production of the manufacturer. From the perspective of supply chain, this dissertation solves the optimal inventory policy for each model and compares the effects of these two carbon regulations on the optimal profits and carbon emissions. On the other hand, this dissertation develops a manufacturer Stackelberg game under carbon cap-and-trade regulation for a two-echelon supply chain with deteriorating items consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer and analyzes the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer. In this model, the market demand is considered to be affected by emission reduction technology level of the manufacturer, promotional effort, selling price and current inventory level of the retailer. This dissertation solves the equilibrium solutions and analyzes the effects of carbon cap-and-trade regulation on the decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer.Finally, by considering the game behavior between the memerbers of the supply chian, this dissertation further proposes contract mechanisms to coordinate supply chain for deteriorating items under carbon emission regulations. On the one hand, this dissertation considers a two-echelon supply chain for deteriorating items consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer over a finite planning horizon. We study the coordination of the system under carbon tax regulation by designing some effective contracts. For a supply chain structure in which the demand is pushed by the production, the dissertation first formulates and compares a centralized model and a decentralized model, and obtains a lower bound of the benefit from the cooperation. A revenue-sharing contract and two-part tariff contract are then developed to coordinate the system, and the necessary conditions of attaining a win-win outcome under each contract are derived, respectively. At last, a numerical example with sensitivity analysis is provided to compare the profits and carbon emissions of the supply chain under these two contracts. On the other hand, the dissertation considers a two-echelon supply chain for deteriorating items consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in a infinite planning horizon. For a supply chain structure in which the production is pulled by the demand and carbon cap-and-trade regulation is imposed on the system, a coordination policy is analyzed. Comparing the profits of the supply chain between the centralized system and the decentralized system yields an upper bound of the benefit from the cooperation. A revenue-sharing contract is developed to coordinate this system and the necessary and sufficient condition of attaining a win-win outcome is obtained. At last, the effects of cap-and-trade regulation on the supply chain coordination are illustrated by numerical analysis.