Coordination Of A Socially Responsible Supply Chain Under Cap-and-trade Regulation

Since economic reform and open up in China,enterprises simply pursue the rapid growth of profit,which has a serious negative impact on natural environment and human society.Many stakeholders expect these companies to take responsibility for their business activities.Thus,sustainable development has become an important research topic for both business managers and academic researchers.Since the corporate social responsibility plays an important role in the sustainable development of supply chain,it is necessary to make a deep study on the socially responsible supply chain management.In order to achieve comprehensive sustainable development,channel members should consider corresponding corporate social responsibility while pursuing economic benefits.Corporate social responsibility mainly includes environmental responsibility and social welfare responsibility.For a dyadic manufacturer-retailer supply chain with corporate social responsibility and cap-and-trade regulation,the price and carbon emission reduction decisions of channel members and supply chain coordination are investigated under both retailer-Stackelberg and manufacturer-Stackelberg supply chains.The main research work of the dissertation is outlined as follows:From the perspective of environmental responsibility and social welfare responsibility,we investigate the influence of supply chain decision-making framework and channel leadership on supply chain optimal decision,and reveal the rules of behavior characteristics to supply chain enterprises and society.The main results can be obtained as follows:the retail price,carbon emission reduction level,and sales quantity may simultaneously increase with the degree of retailer's social welfare responsibility;for the retailer-Stackelberg supply chain,the retailer does not always benefit from the increase of efficiency of investment of carbon emission reduction technology(consumer's environmental awareness);for the manufacturer-Stackelberg supply chain,the manufacturer and retailer may simultaneously benefit from the increase of degree of retailer's social welfare responsibility;there may be a first-mover disadvantage for the manufacturer.Based on the behavior characteristics of channel members and the deterministic environment,we design a two-part tariff contract and a Groves wholesale price contract to coordinate retailer-Stackelberg supply chain and manufacturer-Stackelberg supply chain,respectively.Moreover,we analyze the allocation of channel benefit in detail.The main results can be obtained as follows:two-part tariff contract and Groves wholesale price contract can coordinate retailer-Stackelberg supply chain and manufacturer-Stackelberg supply chain,respectively;the increase of the degree of retailer's social welfare responsibility(consumer's environmental awareness or the efficiency of investment of carbon emission reduction technology)can effectively increase cooperation opportunities between channel members.We keep on investigating how to coordinate the supply chain after demand disruption.We consider two coordination mechanisms,two-part tariff contract and Groves wholesale price contract.We fin d that,when the disrupted amount of demand is small,only the carbon emission reduction level and production quantity do not need to be adjusted under the centralized supply chain.We also find that,under the two-part tariff contract,only the carbon emission reduction level,wholesale price and production quantity do not need to be adjusted when the disrupted amount of demand is small;otherwise,all the decision variables should be adjusted;under the Groves wholesale price contract,only the carbon emission reduction level and production quantity do not need to be adjusted when the disrupted amount of demand is small;otherwise,all the decision variables should be adjusted.