Research On Coordination And Price Decision Of Closed-Loop Supply Chains

As the importance of the environmental protection and sustainable development is being widely recognized,and recycling wasted products for remanufacturing can help the manufacturers save natural resources and increase profits,the study on closed-loop supply chains has become a research hotspot in management research.Forward logistics and reverse logistics are integrated,and a closed-loop supply chain is formed.Closed-loop supply chain includes forward logistics as well as return,remanufacturing,recycling and other waste disposal of reverse operations.As different members of the closed-loop supply chain have different decision goals,their interest conflicts are inevitable in the process of cooperation,which leads to lower performance and lower profit of the closed-loop supply chain operations.New problems emerge in closed-loop supply chain management.Based on contract theory,game theory and optimization methods,using qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis research methods,this dissertation discusses the issues of profit sharing and coordination mechanisms in depth.Pricing strategies and coordination mechanism for the closed-loop supply chain under asymmetric information,decision model for closed-loop supply chain with uncertain demand and price-dependent returns,reverse channel selection and price decision for the closed-loop supply chain with different power structures,logistics strategies and compensation mechanism for the closed-loop supply chain considering two-way leading dissimilar are mainly studied.Major researches are in the following areas:(1)Pricing strategies and coordination mechanism for the closed-loop supply chain under asymmetric information are studied.In the context of a single-manufacturer and single-retailer closed loop supply chain,the game between manufacturer and retailer is studied from the point of principal-agency theory.Then the contracts with which the manufacturer can coordinate the system under symmetric and asymmetric information are analyzed respectively.It is concluded that the manufacturer can utilize a menu of contracts to screen the private information to avoid the moral hazard of the retailer and promote her own profit.Finally,the result is validated by numerical analysis.(2)Decision models for the closed-loop supply chain with uncertain demand and price-dependent returns are studied.A single product closed-loop supply chain that satisfies an uncertain market demand with original and remanufactured products is considered.The yield of the recovery process is random and depends on the acquisition price offered for the end-of-life products.In such a stochastic setting,a firm needs to make production and procurement decisions so that the total expected profit is maximized.Centralized model with a direct reverse channel and decentralized model with a third party recovery are established.The optimal acquisition price and production quantities of original and remanufactured products are determined for the firm.The contracts to coordinate the decentralized systems are chosen and the optimal contract parameters are determined.(3)Reverse channel selection and price decision for the closed-loop supply chain with a dominant retailer are studied.Price decision and system profit are comparatively analyzed by means of centralized and three decentralized decision models based on game theory and optimization methods.The main results show that under market structure with leading retailer,the closed loop supply chain has the lower selling price and the higher recovery rate when the manufacturer selected the direct reverse channel.Manufacturer and retailer's profits and total channel profits are highest,so it is beneficial to customers and the society.(4)Pricing strategies of dual channel closed-loop supply chain with different power structures are studied.Optimal recovery rate,price decision and system efficiency of a closed-loop supply chain are analyzed under the competition of an online retailer and a traditional retailer based on game theory.The main results show that under market structure with leading manufacture,the benefits of manufacturers are greater than that under the leadership of the retailers,but the benefits of the other members and the supply chain are less;for retailers,consumers,and resource environment,the benefits under the leadership of the retailers are greater than that under the leadership of the manufacturers.(5)Pricing strategy,logistics strategies and subsidy mechanism are studied under the circumstances of manufacturers leading in the forward supply chain and sellers leading in the reverse supply chain.Results show that the strategy chosen by the leading enterprises does not guarantee the stability of supply chain.When leading enterprises and subordinate enterprises have differences in the selection of the logistics strategy,leading companies can not fully take the way of subsidizing subordinate enterprises to keep the supply chain stability.Due to the closed-loop supply chain is composed of forward and reverse subsystems,the government should consider the integrity of the supply chain to give remanufacturing subsidies.Thus,on the one hand,supply chain node enterprises remanufacturing can be encouraged,on the other hand,supply chain stability can keeped.