Asymmetric Distribution Of Residual Control Rights And Residual Claims Of Founders

Founders and external investors have always been the focus of attention in the theoretical and practical circles.The founders of a start-up enterprise are important"knowledge-based" resources,who often can bring important business capital,political capital for the enterprise,and play a key role in the survival and development of the enterprise.External investors are not only the suppliers of capital,but also the decisive factors that affect the future development of enterprises.However,when the external investors invest in the venture enterprises,based on the realistic needs of obtaining high returns,risk prevention,strategic deployment and so on,the distribution of residual control rights and residual claim rights between the founders and external investors has changed,which has beco,me the focus of our study.According to the distribution characteristics of residual control rights and residual claims,it can be divided into two modes:symmetry distribution and asymmetry distribution.The distribution of residual control rights and residual claim rights is symmetrical,which conforms to the principle of equivalence of rights,responsibilities and interests and is the basic paradigm of modern corporate governance.In reality,the asymmetry between the residual control rights and residual claim rights of the founders of start-ups has aroused our attention to new issues,which can be divided into two scenarios.(1)Distribution of high residual control rights and low residual claim rights.In the process of introducing external investors,the enterprises represented by Alibaba Group and JD retained the larger residual control rights through system design,which could determine the major issues of the future development of enterprises.However,the proportion of shareholdings was seriously diluted due to the introduction of financial funds.The right of the founders to obtain the future surplus of enterprises is dipped.(2)The distribution of low residual control rights and high residual claim rights.The majority of LeEco's equity is owned by Jia Yueting,the founder of the enterprise,and most of the residual claim right is retained.However,the residual control right of the enterprise is firmly controlled by external investors.It is thought-provoking why the residual control rights and the residual claims are asymmetrically distributed.What impact will it have on enterprises?Therefore,this paper focuses on the asymmetrical distribution of residual control rights and residual claim rights of the founders of venture enterprises,and analyzes the mechanism of the relationship between residual control rights,residual claim rights and enterprise performance.This paper chooses the data of GEM from 2012 to 2016 as the research sample,and the empirical test results are as follows:in high residual control rights and low residual claim rights distribution model,residual control rights and corporate performance are negatively correlated,residual claim rights and corporate performance are positively correlated;in low residual control rights and high residual claim rights distribution model,the residual control rights are positively correlated with enterprise perfonnance,while the residual claim rights are negatively correlated with enterprise performance.Furthermore,this paper examines whether there is an intermediary relationship between residual control rights,residual claim rights and firm performance.The results show that:in the distribution of high residual control rights and low residual claim rights,residual control rights do not affect enterprise performance through residual claim rights,and the possible reason is that the rights of residual control rights which affect salary,stock options and so on are controlled by external investors;in the distribution of low residual control rights and high residual claim rights,the residual control rights affect the performance of enterprises through residual claim rights,and three is a suppressing effect relationship.Based on the incomplete contracting theory,this paper analyzes the asymmetric distribution of residual control rights and residual claim rights of founders,explores how the residual control rights and residual claim rights of founders affect enterprise performance under different circumstances,and attempts to provide new insights into the allocation of residual control rights and residual claims for founders of enterprises..The theoretical contributions of this paper are as follows:Firstly,from the perspective of incomplete contract theory,this paper breaks through the limitation of understanding the problem of residual control rights and residual claim rights of venture enterprises,and provides a new perspective for further exploring the distribution of residual control rights and residual claim rights of founders.Secondly,there are few empirical studies.This paper further enriches the relevant research methods of residual control rights and residual claims.Thirdly,from the perspective of residual control rights and residual claim rights,this paper investigates how the founder's residual control rights and residual claim rights affect the firm performance under asymmetric conditions.Fourthly,it further deepens the understanding of the operating mechanism of the board of directors and management of venture enterprises,and provides a new perspective for improving the corporate governance of venture enterprises.