Running Logic Of Environmental Protection Law Enforcement At Grass-roots Level

Based on the law enforcement behavior of rural enterprises pollution supervision,this paper deeply analyses the power relationship and structure of rural farmers,rural enterprises,township governments,county environmental protection departments,county governments and central government on the aspect of promoting the implementation of national laws,and refines the political logic of grass-roots environmental protection law enforcement practice from the perspective of government operation process.It also explains how the elastic Tiao-kuai Relation structure shapes the grass-roots environmental protection law enforcement.By the practical experience,the premise of rural enterprises 'pollution supervision and enforcement is the existence of enterprise environmental violations and the effective way that transmits the signal to county law enforcement departments.The pollution of rural enterprises always occurs in a certain field.The difference between social subjects' perception and perception of pollution in a specific field will affect the expression of environmental interests.Different farmers' perceptions,values and interests of pollution in villages lead to weak organization of farmers,which directly affects the expression of environmental interests in village society.From the perspective of the relationship between the state and society,the weak organization of farmers will affect the way and intensity of the intervention of the national law enforcement forces.Only farmers reflect the damage they have suffered and release strong signals of environmental violations,will the intensity and intensity of the intervention of national law enforcement forces increase.However,in the specific law enforcement process,it depends on the authoritative technical identification of the state that whether rural enterprises' sewage discharge behavior constitutes an environmental violation.When the state identifies the specific environmental violations of rural enterprises,there are often conflicts among the scientific and technological rationality of pollution identification as well as the rationality of village life.There are conflicts of environmental interests between farmers and enterprises.There are authoritative domination,discourse domination and information domination in the definition of pollution by county-level environmental protection departments and township governments.Farmers' perceptions of pollution based on living rationality are often marginalized,which provides a huge room for the township government and county-level environmental protection departments to mediate environmental disputes between enterprises and farmers.After several interest games playing with enterprises,township governments and county-level environmental protection departments,farmers have gradually fallen into a "compensation trap".Symbolic pollution compensation gradually replaces the substantive legal supervision.County-level government,county-level environmental protection department andtownship government are in the Tiao-kuai Relationship.The position and attitude of the county-level government determine the position and attitude of the county-level environmental protection department and the township government in the process of promoting law enforcement.Restricted by the location of Tiao-kuai Relationship power structure and the embeddedness of political and commercial relations,county environmental protection departments will not strictly enforce the law,however,they will cooperate with rural enterprises and choose the "penalty for custody" strategy,so that the law can not be fully implemented."Punishment instead of management" not only coordinates the political and commercial relationship between county leaders and rural enterprises,but also shapes the law enforcement authority of county-level environmental protection departments to a certain extent.However,instead of facing the pollution problem directly,the "penalty instead of management" makes the rural enterprises' sewage discharge behavior have legitimacy.Although some peasants keep petitioning,according to the principle of territorial management of letters and visits,the township government is ultimately required to deal with them.Therefore,when implementing the national environmental protection law,the township government must coordinate the power relationship between rural enterprises and rural households.The township government is constrained by the dual assessment mechanism of county government development and stability,the power-interest relationship network of grass-roots society and the lack of self-governance resources,and often chooses a vague way to deal with pollution.The ambiguity of the township government when dealing with the pollution disputes between rural enterprises and farmers actually conceals the territorial responsibility of the township government that implements the national environmental protection law.Because the position of county-level government is to safeguard the interests of rural enterprises,increase local financial revenue,couple with the complex human relations network of grass-roots society,the county-level environmental protection departments and township governments fail to strictly enforce the national environmental protection law,and pay real attention to the governance of pollution problems of rural enterprises,which lead to the implementation of the national law have always been in a "suspension" state.From the perspective of law enforcement,there are deviations in the implementation of national environmental protection law objectives.At the same time,farmers damaged by pollution also suffer frustration in the expression of interest claims.Environmental protection supervision is a kind of institutional innovation to promote the enforcement of environmental protection laws within the Party-government System Structure.By conducting political pressure in various ways,the central environmental protection supervision makes the local Party committee and government attach importance to environmental protection work.At the same time,the local Party committee and government will set up relevant organizations to deal with the environmental problemsfeedback from the central environmental protection supervision.After perceiving the political pressure of the central environmental protection supervision,the county Party committee government attaches great importance to the feedback of the central environmental protection supervision group,integrates the forces of several law enforcement departments to carry out joint law enforcement,and implements it to each law enforcement officer through the mechanism of responsibility inversion.At this time,the grass-roots environmental protection law enforcement is intensified.This has changed the "suspension" state of law enforcement in the past,and make the national law infiltrate into the practice of pollution supervision and law enforcement of rural enterprises.Through environmental protection supervision,some prominent environmental problems about the grassroots people have been solved,due to the information asymmetry between the central and local governments,it is difficult for the central government to effectively supervise the environmental governance effect of local governments,and the central environmental protection supervision can hardly force the local government to tackle the environmental problems as a whole.Therefore,the deviation of grass-roots environmental protection law enforcement is only moderately corrected by the central government.When the power of the central government intervenes in the practice of local Tiao-kuai performing duties,the relationship between the central government and the local government in the Tiao-kuai Relationship Power Structure can give full play to the political integration function of the party and government system.From the perspective of law enforcement,when the practice of environmental protection law enforce at the grass-roots level deviates greatly from the legal objectives,the central government can integrate the power relations among county governments,environmental protection departments at the county level,Township governments,rural enterprises and village farmers through political integration,break the obstruction of national environmental protection laws in local implementation,and promote the penetration of national environmental protection laws into grass-roots society.At the same time,it integrates the conflicts of interest in the process of law enforcement,so that the deviation of law enforcement practice can be moderately corrected.However,this kind of correction is not static,but will form multiple interaction and game relationship with the deviation of law enforcement in the dynamic,and seek moderation in the deviation.Throughout the grass-roots environmental law enforcement process,we can see that the environmental interests of rural society in conventional environmental law enforcement can not be absorbed into the government's decision-making and implementation process.When the environmental interests of rural society can not be effectively absorbed and integrated by local governments,and lead to the deviation of law enforcement objectives and affecting the political authority of the central government,the central government can innovate a series of systems within the established institutional structure to promote theimplementation of environmental protection laws.Through the form of environmental protection supervision,the central government has established institutionalized links between the central and grassroots people,and through the transmission of political pressure,the local government has reactivated the expression of opinions,government decision-making and government implementation in the process of starting a new round of government,so that the environmental interests of grassroots society can be absorbed into local government decision-making and implementation.Hence,the elasticity of Tiao-kuai Relationship Power Structure,which is based on the Party-government relationship,exists all the time.The elastic Tiao-kuai Relationship Structure shapes grass-roots environmental law enforcement practice,and always shows fluctuation in practice.