Study On The Dynamic Strategies Of Cooperative Emission Reduction In Supply Chain Considering The Government Subsidy

Under the background of low-carbon economy,with the increasing of consumers' low-carbon awareness and the increasingly strict government policies to reduce emissions,enterprises have to pay more attention to carbon emissions.Reducing carbon emissions and achieving sustainable economic development has become the key measure for enterprises to acquire core competitiveness.Since the production process of products is achieved through the form of supply chain,the decisions of enterprises to reduce emissions are affected by the decisions of both the upstream enterprises and the downstream enterprises to reduce emissions.Therefore,in order to reduce the carbon emissions of products,it is necessary for all the nodes in the supply chain to work closely together to find ways to reduce carbon emissions.To strengthen cooperation between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain by the contract,and the government stimulates the enterprises' emission reduction behavior by the subsidy mechanism,so that the dual objectives of efficient use of enterprises resources and protect the environment will be achieved.In addition,considering that enterprises' decisions often have a lag effect.Therefore,study on the dynamic strategies of cooperative emission reduction in supply chain considering the government subsidy,which provides a theoretical basis for the low-carbon management of supply chain and the scientific formulation of government's subsidy policy.This research aiming at the following four aspects mainly:(1)Study on the dynamic coordination of the supply chain considering the government subsidy,where both the supplier and manufacturer are engaged in emission reduction inputs.By means of differential game theory,it is considered that the government provides emission reduction subsidy to both the supplier and manufacturer.Meanwhile,the product's demand is affected by the emission reduction.Then the centralized and decentralized differential game models are established,and the improved bilateral cost-sharing contract designed to coordinate the supply chain.Combined with the examples,it is reasonable to verify that the improved bilateral cost-sharing contract.Moreover,we analyze that the government subsidy mechanism is effective on the improvement to product's emission reduction and enterprises'profits.(2)Then,we study the formulation of government's subsidy strategy and the cooperative emission reduction in supply chain under different game structures.Based on the research content in part 1,the government is used as a game participant to establish differential game models under three decisions.Whether the government subsidy is considered or not,as for the three decisions,we can obtain and compare the optimal feedback equilibrium strategies,and the optimal trajectories of product's emission reduction.Then,we discuss the interaction game between government subsidy behaviors and companies' choice of reducing emissions in cooperation.Moreover,the sensitivity analysis of the relevant parameters is conducted by the simulation,to verify the validity of conclusions,which provides scientific basis for long-term cooperative emission reduction in supply chain's upstream and downstream enterprises and the subsidy policy made by government.(3)Further,we study the cooperative emission reduction and low-carbon propaganda in supply chain,when the government subsidy and the leadership of retailer are considered.The dominant position of large retailer in emission reduction activities is becoming increasingly prominent.Meanwhile,it is easy to communicate the manufacturer's emission reduction input information to consumers,since the retailers have the advantage of being close to the market.In this context,drawing on the idea of model in part 2,the long-term vertical cooperatwve emission reduction,low-carbon propaganda in a supply chain comprised of a manufacturer and retailer,and the subsidy strategies of government is studied.Considering that the demand is affected by product's emission reduction and retailer's low-carbon propaganda effort,the Stackelbeg differential game models are established under the leadership of retailers.Whether the government subsidy is considered or not,we compare and analyze the optimal equilibrium strategies under the centralized,decentralized and cost-sharing contract.And we discuss the interaction between government and supply chain members.(4)Extend the model to the dual-channel supply chain.The development of online sales channels brings opportunities and challenges to the development of manufacturing enterprises.If the low-carbon products are sold by the dual-channel model,it is not only effectively reduces carbon emissions during the selling,but also meets consumers' needs for products' personalization and diversification.However,channel conflicts can also bring challenges to enterprises' decisions.In this context,we expand the model based on part 3,and take the price factors and government subsidy into the analytical framework.Meanwhile,both the product's emission reduction and goodwill are used as state variables.It is considered that the demand is affected by both price and non-price factors,and the non-price factors include the product's emission reduction and goodwill.Then,we establish the differential game models in dual-channel supply chain under the centralized,wholesale price contract and the revenue-sharing contract.Whether the government subsidy is considered or not,we compare and analyze the optimal equilibrium strategies under three decisions.Since the double marginal effect and channel conflict bring the loss of profit to the supply chain,then the role of the revenue-sharing contract is discussed in improving the loss of supply chain's profit by the simulation.Meanwhile,we analyze the intensity in improving product's emission reduction and enterprises' profits by the government subsidy mechanism under different decisions.