A Research On Game Problem Between The Government And Enterprises Based On The Subsidy Policy For Energy Saving And Emission Reduction

With the more extreme and more frequent changes of climate generated by industrial activities of human society, the development of low carbon economy becomes the inevitable choice at this stage. Besides, promoting energy saving and emission reduction won widespread concern in all countries as an important means of developing low-carbon economy. As a responsible country, China has made detailed and specific binding targets on reduction in both "the Eleventh Five-Year Plan" and "the Twelfth". At the same time, in view of the presence of high corporate investments and high risk of the reality in promoting energy conservation and emission reduction, the government has implemented a wide range of subsidy policies. Achieving quite significant and remarkable effects, there are also some certain questions existing.Subsidy policy for energy saving and emission reduction has been widely used in our country, but the high-cost expenditures promote the existence of gaming between enterprise and the government in the process of advancing energy saving and emission reduction. Considering the subsidy policy for energy saving and emission reduction, we take two different situations which consist of single-cycle and multi-cycle period as the classification criteria to explores the choice and changes of dependence of strategies between the government and enterprises using signal game theory and determine the sufficient condition of achieving the state of equilibrium under the circumstance of complete success according to the benefits of different parties. In single-cycle period, behavior changes between the government and enterprises upon subsidies are abstracted to signaling game according to the existing governmental subsidy policy document, this paper constructs a signaling game model of enterprise and government on subsidies.In multi-cycle period, First, we determine the sufficient condition of achieving the state of equilibrium under the circumstance of complete success according to the benefits of different parties on the basis of the conclusion of the aforementioned single-cycle game. And then, taking the separating equilibrium as the initial state and exploring the constraints to keep that condition stable and continuing with the help of stochastic differential equation. Based on the theoretical model constructed, we analyze the amount of subsidies, illegal costs and loss of enthusiasm dampened and do numerical simulation to verify the validity of the model above with the help of Matlab software to provide theoretical reference and guidance on improving the effect of emission reduction efficiently.The analysis shows that, owing to information asymmetry and imperfection, three kinds of equilibrium including complete success, partial success and complete failure come to existence, and efficiency of market equilibrium will be influenced by the disguised cost and expected risk cost, therefore, the key to achieve completely successful balance is to improve the camouflage cost of enterprise fraud and the expected cost of risk, and thus appropriate policies should be focused on fields such as refining policies&standards, increasing the efficiency of checks and, setting penalties in large; and then we make a simple analysis of collusion between government and enterprises at the same time, building a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional assessment indicators, giving play to inquiry and supervision raised by third parties such as the public and media can constrain the collusion between government and enterprises effectively.