Study On Multi-Agent Collaboration Mechanism And Synergistic Effect Of Energy Emergency

Energy is the lifeblood of a country's normal operation.The sudden events,such as energy disruption,energy transmission,or sudden increase in energy consumption all lead to energy shortages,causing abnormal fluctuations in the energy market and threatening the energy safety of enterprises,regions,countries and even the world.In recent years,energy shortages caused by natural disasters,political conflicts or other factors have occurred frequently in the world.With the rapid development of China's economy,the increasing level of energy consumption,the high dependence on foreign energy,China's energy system has become fragile.Coal shortages,oil shortages,and gas shortages have taken place in succession,resulting in the national economy and people's lives.The serious impact on the country's energy emergency management system put forward a severe test,aroused the attention of the government.Energy emergency involves many stakeholders,and it needs various regions,departments to achieve multi-agent,multi-level effective collaboration to ensure that the energy shortage situation is controlled as soon as possible.However,in reality,there are some problems in China's energy emergency collaboration process,including the unclear powers and responsibilities of the collaboration agents,the phenomenon of “multi-headed leadership and pushing each other”,the low collaboration initiative of the emergencyagents,over-reliance on the strength of the central government or the extremely strong temporary energy emergency collaborative,which has resulted the low efficiency of energy emergency collaboration.Constructing and improving an effective collaboration mechanism can provide methods and guarantees for the emergency work of the agents,reduce emergency costs,improve China's energy emergency response and energy emergency response capabilities,and solve current problems in the energy emergency coordination process.At present,the scholars have not studied the energy emergency collaboration problem from the perspective of multi-agents.How to improve the agents' emergency collaboration capability requires relevant theoretical support and method guidance.Therefore,this paper elaborates the achievements,existing problems and causes of energy emergency management in China and constructs a framework of energy emergency collaboration mechanism,including formation mechanism,operation mechanism,and safeguard mechanism.Based on the analysis of the functions and roles of the stakeholders involved in the energy emergency,it is used the right-legitimate-emergency stakeholder analysis model of Mitchell to find key stakeholders,and analyzed the common interests and conflicts of interest among key stakeholders.Immediately afterwards,an evolutionary game model of the two main bodies of the government and energy supply chain enterprises was constructed to study the selection of behavioral strategies for energy emergency agents and master the energy emergency evolution mechanism.Secondly,the three-party differential game model of the central government,local governments,and energy supply chain enterprises was constructed,and the emergency coordination action mechanism between China and other countries was studied.Once again addressing the interim issues of the energy emergency collaboration mechanism,we have constructed a mathematical model under the two circumstances: only the current emergency co-resource input,with both the prior and current two resource inputs.Finally,the concept of "collaborative entropy" was introduced to reveal the mechanism of the energy emergency synergy effect,and a social network model of energy emergency synergy was constructed.An empirical analysis was made based on related cases.Based on the results obtained from the above research,we propose and improve the energy emergency collaboration mechanism's countermeasures and suggestions to achieve the goal of improving energy emergency collaboration efficiency.The main research contents and research conclusions of this paper are as follows:Firstly,summarizing the current achievements of China has made in the energy emergency collaboration mechanism,and at the same time elaborating the problems existing in the energy emergency collaboration mechanism and the reasons for these problems.Secondly,it elaborated the energy emergency collaboration system and its elements,including emergency agents,object,emergency activities,emergency resources,and environment.It is analyzed the definition,characteristics,and classification of emergency objects.It is analyzed the functions and roles of the stakeholders involved in the energy emergency.It is used Mitchell's rights-legitimate-emergency stakeholder analysis model to find key stakeholders,including governments(central government,local governments)and energy supply chain entereprises.At the same time,it analyzes the conflicts of interest and common points among key stakeholders.It is analyzed the emergency resources and emergency activities owned by each emergency agents.Finally,the theoretical framework of the energy emergency collaboration mechanism was elaborated,including energy emergency coordination formation mechanism,energy emergency collaboration operation mechanism and energy emergency collaboration protection mechanism.The three mechanisms complement each other to realize the energy emergency collaboration effect.Thirdly,an evolutionary game model for two main bodies of government and energy supply chain enterprises was constructed to study the selection of behavioral strategies for energy emergency agents and master the energy emergency evolution mechanism.The model is solved to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of replicating dynamic systems under different parameters.According to the results of the research,it is concluded that to grasping the evolution direction of the energy emergency game system must be considered the three factors: the emergency cost of the energy supply chain enterprises,the government's penalties,and the degree of collaboration between the two agents.Fourthly,it is firstly constructed a three-party differential game model of emergency collaboration for the central government,local governments,and energy supply chain enterprises,and compared or analyzed the two situations based on whether or not reward and punishment compensation mechanisms are introduced.The results show that the degree of emergency efforts of each agent is negatively correlated with emergency costs.The level of local government's emergency efforts is positively correlated with the central government's assessment criteria,supervision,punishment,and compensation.The degree of emergency efforts of energy supply chain enterprises with local government assessment standards,supervision,punishment,or compensation is positively related.At the same time,the introduction of rewards and punishments compensation mechanism can increase the degree of emergency efforts and interests of the agents.Fifthly,it builds a mathematical model for the temporary problems of the energy emergency collaboration mechanism.Through the research results,we can see that the daily emergency collaborative resources investment can improve the efficiency of the emergency response of t he agents.At the same time,the government's commitment to excessive emergency work will result in unnecessary waste of resources.In addition,the establishment of reasonable compensation can increase the energy supply chain enterprise emergencyagents' initiative,and then improve the efficiency of energy emergency collaboration.Sixthly,the energy emergency collaboration differential game model between China and other countries was constructed.The results show that the punishment mechanism can increase the state's level of emergency efforts,increase the interests,and also promote the emergency collaboration among the national entities.Seventhly,the concept of “entropy” in synergetics theory was used to study the mechanism of the energy emergency collaboration effect.It is defined the emergency tasks that the energy emergency agents assumed during the emergency process.Taking the shortage of natural gas in China in November 2017 as an example,it is build a collaborative matrix based on social network analysis to calculate the degree of collaboration,collaboration entropy,and collaboration efficiency of each task node and each agent.The results show that China's energy emergency collaboration efficiency is relatively low,but the three main task nodes of the government's emergency plan preparation,supervision and evaluation,and resource coordination are relatively high.Finally,based the above study proposes,constructing and improving the energy emergency coordination mechanism needs from four aspects: clarifying the subject's rights,responsibilities and obligations,reducing energy emergency costs,accelerating the establishment of energy emergency response mechanisms,and establishing a normalized energy emergency collaboration mechanism.There are 42 figures,20 tables and 261 references in the paper.