The Influence Of Land Rights Structure And Village Democracy On Farmers' Forestry Input And Income

In order to further stimulate farmers to carry out forestry production,make full use of forestry resources,improve forestry production efficiency,and thereby increase forestry farmers' forestry income,the new round of collective forest rights reform will pass most of China's collective forest land property rights through “one village and one policy”.The forestto-house approach shifts to the farmer level.The forest area involved is large and there are many poor people involved.Therefore,the government and forest farmers have high hopes for the ecological,economic and social benefits of such collective forest rights reform.According to institutional economics,the changes in institutions,especially the property rights system,are an important reason for economic development.And the impact of the system on economic development is mainly achieved through the basic rules established by it directly affecting public and private behaviors and income distribution,resource allocation efficiency and human resource development.Therefore,it can be considered that the new property rights system established by the new round of collective forest tenure reform will have an important impact on farmers' forestland resource utilization behavior and corresponding economic benefits.Although some studies have confirmed that the new round of collective forest rights reform has certain investment incentive effect and income effect,however,some studies believe that the effectiveness of this round of collective forest rights reform has not been fully released.This is due to the fact that this round of reforms has resulted in the fragmentation of forest land,the increase in transaction and management costs,and other factors that offset some of the investment incentives and income effects of the reform.In addition,the lack of democratic procedures in the collective reform of collective forest rights has led to insufficient understanding of the content and intentions of collective forest tenure reform policies,which in turn has led farmers to lack confidence in the new forest land property rights system and thus lack investment incentives.However,in the existing literature on the investment incentive effect and income effect of collective forest rights reform,the literature considering the democratic factors of villages is relatively scarce.On the other hand,the existing dual-virtual variables in the existing literature are used torepresent the occurrence of collective forest rights reform.This method often loses the policy connotation of many collective forest rights reforms,and cannot fully reflect the specific content of reforms on the adjustment of farmers' forest property rights structure.Based on the above existing research deficiencies,based on the farmer behavior theory,property rights theory,institutional change theory and social psychology theory,based on the systematic review of relevant research results at home and abroad,the field of 658 households in Fujian,Jiangxi and Hunan provinces was used.Investigating data and data,and constructing the main line of "collective forest rights reform(mainly concerned with the changes in the land rights structure and the village democratic procedures involved in the process)-farmers' perceptions-farmers' behaviors-behavioral effects)Based on the dual perspectives of land rights structure and village democracy,based on systematic measurement of land rights structure and village democracy,and taking full account of the interaction between the two,the paper analyzes its forestry risk perception and income expectations,forestry inputs and income.The impact mechanism,and comprehensive use of econometrics and statistical methods to empirically test the above theoretical hypothesis,in order to further deepen the reform of collective forest rights and promote the construction of village democratic system,encourage farmers to invest in forestry,revitalize forestry production resources,and ultimately improve farmers Forestry income provides theoretical support and policy reference.Firstly,based on the strict definition of the structure of land rights and the organic components of the villages involved in the reform process,systematic measurement indicators are constructed to calculate the land rights structure and the index of democratic development of the village.Because the forestry production risk and income expectation that farmers recognize is the basis of their behavior decision-making,this study first uses the Ordered Probit model to analyze the impact of land rights structure and village democracy on forestry production risk and income expectations.The land rights structure and the village democratic procedure can indirectly affect the forestry income of the farmers by affecting the forestry input behavior of the farmers.Therefore,this paper then uses the Double-Hurdle regression model to verify the impact of land rights structure and village democracy on farmers' forestry input,and uses the quantile regression model to test the relationship between the two and farmers' forestry income.The specific research conclusions are as follows:(1)The use of forest land use rights,disposal rights,and income rights in the reform of collective forest rights can significantly affect the economic risk perception of farmers' forestry production,and the three land rights sub-items can be relatively significant.The positive impact on farmers' ecological risk perception and social risk perception.In addition,village democracy can have a stable and significant positive impact on farmers' riskperceptions in three aspects.Village democracy can also significantly regulate the impact of forest property rights structure optimization on farmers' risk perception,and this adjustment effect can be realized simultaneously through forest land use rights,disposal rights and income rights.Moreover,village democracy can adjust the impact of land tenure structure optimization on farmer's forestry income expectations at different significant levels.(2)The right to use and the right to dispose can significantly promote the forestry labor force and capital investment probability of the farmers relatively stably,and can effectively affect the investment level of farmers.In addition,village democracy can significantly positively regulate the investment incentive effect of property rights structure optimization,and this adjustment effect is mainly achieved through the use rights and disposal rights of forest land,and this adjustment effect is in the decision of farmer labor and capital investment.No significant difference.In addition,the empirical results show that the optimization of farmer's forest land income rights does not produce a stable and significant investment incentive effect on farmers,and village democracy has no significant regulatory effect on it.(3)The forest ownership process of the forest property rights structure optimization and reform process caused by the forest tenure reform has a significant income effect,and the income effect intensity of the use right and the disposal right is greater than the income right,and the effect is different in forestry income.There were no significant differences among the horizontal farmers.Village democracy may be able to influence the forest farmers' policy awareness,confidence and income expectations for collective forest rights reform,significantly affecting the income effect of property rights structure optimization,and village democracy can directly affect farmers' forestry income,and can also adjust forest tenure reform.The income effect,which may be achieved mainly by affecting the policy attitude of farmers on the right to use and dispose of forest land.In addition,forest tenure reform and village democracy have a significant resource allocation effect in addition to the investment incentive effect of forest farmers' income.Similar to the logic of the influence of village democracy on regulating the comprehensive income effect of forest tenure reform,village democracy can also significantly regulate the resource allocation effect of forest tenure reform on farmers' forestry income,and this regulation effect mainly plays through farmers' forest land use rights and disposal rights.