Study On Food Safety Regualtion Under The Overall Responsibility Of Local Government

People's growing needs for better life put forward higher requirements for food safety.However,the Food Safety Development Report(2017)showed that the national food safety incidents reported by the mainstream network during 2007-2016 reached 256,287,with an average of 70.2 cases per day.Therefore,how to improve food safety supervision to reduce food safety risks is a very practical research topic.According to the existing "Food Safety Law" and other laws and regulations,China adopts the system of overall responsibility of local governments,that is,local governments lead,organize,and coordinate food safety supervision and management work within their respective administrative regions.However,the previous research mainly regarded the government as a whole,and focused on the food safety supervision system,but did not distinguish the central government from the local government,ignoring the key factor of local government,which lead to some specific problems that cannot be explained during the research process.For example,why does the central government require local governments to take overall responsibility?Why do local governments prefer to risk being accountable and to protect local food companies against the requirements of the central government?Why do local governments often develop food safety systems but do not implement them?Why build a food safety risk social co-governance system?Therefore,it is necessary to explore the supply of food safety based on the basic system of local government responsibility.This is also the core content of this article and this article will emphasize the following three issues based on it:(1)The rationality of the division of power between the central government and local governments.This part mainly introduces the industrial concentration and local government's sense of responsibility,analyzes the rationality of the local government's overall responsibility,and horizontally examines the US's coordinated supervision system based on the federal government's supervision.The study found that the coordinated supervision of the United States under the supervision of the federal government is consistent with the national concentration of the United States and the high sense of responsibility of the state government.The local government,which is mainly based on local governments and emphasizes the responsibility of local governments,bears a total responsibility,to a certain extent,in line with the fact that China's food industry is small and scattered,and the local government's sense of responsibility is low.However,the overall responsibility of the local government will weaken the central government's responsibility and ability to provide national food safety.(2)Local governments relaxed the regulatory issues caused by interest preferences.Officials have a preference for economic and political interests.This part studies the institutional distortions under the preference of interests,the collusion between local governments and food companies,and the deviation of local government's willingness and behavior.The study found that the age and tenure characteristics of officials,the food safety performance appraisal system that ignores the public satisfaction based on the higher-level government,and the strong incentives of the central government for economic development have distorted the local government's regulatory behavior.Local government and food companies' aversion to loss and attitude toward risk,as well as subjective perception of the probability of collusion being discovered,affect collusive decision-making.In addition,the lack of reputation,poor accountability,and inadequate supervision of social subjects led local governments and food companies to identify the perceived benefits more than perceived costs.This is an important reason for the conspiracy.The short-sightedness of local governments led to the failure to implement regulatory documents.This reflects the deviation of supervision will and behavior.(3)The transformation of a single administrative supervision to social co-governance.This section explores the necessity and governance of social co-governance,horizontally compares the differences and connections between public participation in different countries,and empirically studies the main factors affecting the willingness to complain and report and the self-discipline of food companies.The study found that social co-governance is the product of making up for both market and government failures.The participation of social subjects and the self-discipline of food enterprises are an important part of social co-governance.China should rationally formulate relevant systems for public participation in legislation,judiciary and law enforcement in accordance with basic national conditions.As an important part of social co-governance,the willingness of consumers to complain is not high,and the low incentives and imperfect security measures are significant factors.The study also found that different food companies differ greatly in self-discipline.Administrative measures such as administrative penalties and financial subsidies,as well as social governance such as association guidance and media exposure,are significant factors affecting the self-discipline of food companies.The innovations of this paper are as follows:(1)Different scholars have distinct understandings of the rationality of the overall responsibility of local governments.This study integrates industrial concentration and local government's sense of responsibility into the analytical framework,and analyzes the responsibility of local governments from a new perspective,which helps to provide a theoretical basis for further clarifying the relationship between the central and the local governments and improving the vertical system of food safety supervision.(2)In view of the existing government-enterprise collusion research based on the theory of expected utility,ignoring the defects of the psychological factors of the game subject,this paper incorporate the prospect theory of behavioral economics into the collusion supervision game model,clarified the influence of psychological factors such as the degree of aversion of the game on the loss and the attitude towards risk on collusion and collusion supervision,and enriched the research on the collusion between local government and food enterprises.(3)In the research of food enterprise self-discipline,the existing research mainly focuses on the binary logistic model,ignoring the difference in the degree of self-discipline of different enterprises.This paper uses the quantity of behavior of food additives to reflect the degree of self-discipline of enterprises.Using the ordered multi-class Logistic to study,the empirical analysis of the significant factors affecting the self-discipline of enterprises can make up for the deficiency of existing research to some extent.Due to the limited level and time of the author,there are also some shortcomings in this paper.For example,the reasons for the lack of government information disclosure,the limited data sources,and the controversial nature of the selection of indicators have led to inadequate empirical research,and the results are inevitably controversial.In addition,food safety supervision is a multidisciplinary problem,but this paper mainly studies from the perspective of economics,so the conclusion remains to be tested.