Research On The Influence Of Control Rights Allocation Characteristics To State-Owned Enterprises Investment Efficiency In Mixed Ownership Reform

Forty years of reform and opening-up,the Chinese economy has achieved remarkable achievements.As an important component of Chinese economy system,State-owned enterprises have played a vital role.General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized that state-owned enterprises serve as the material basis and political foundation for the Chinese-style socialism,as well as the pillar and power of our party to rejuvenate the country（National Party Construction Work of State-owned Enterprises,2016）.However,due to their special status,state-owned enterprises must deal with some tough problems related to equity,control rights and governance structure.The most common problems include a lack of ownership,indistinguishable between government and enterprise,and the exclusive internal control and management.These problems will weaken the business efficiency,cripple investment decisions and impede the corporate development of the state-owned business.Therefore,the 18^th CPC central Committee of the Third Plenary Session called upon the active development of the mixed ownership economy and the complementary advantages of state-owned and non-state-owned capitals,which will allow the preservation and appreciation of state-owned asset,and hopefully lead to an efficient resource allocation for the whole society.The reform of mixed ownership is not simply a―mixed form‖,what is more important is to use―mixed‖as a means and―reform‖as a purpose to improve the structure of equity and control rights of state-owned enterprise.From the successful experience of China Unicom Group’s mixed ownership reform,it is seen that the―mixed reform‖lies in heterogeneous shareholders,which will inevitably bring about changes in the allocation of control rights for state-owned enterprises.Then,how does the reform of control rights allocation improve the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises?Is the reform beneficial to the state-owned economy?This paper intends to study the influence of control rights reform and its intrinsic characteristics on state-owned enterprises from the perspective of state-owned enterprises investment efficiency in mixed ownership reform,which provides empirical evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of mixed ownership reform correctly,and explore effective control rights allocation of state-owned enterprises.Based on the above analysis,this paper constructs the theoretical and empirical research framework of―Reform of Control Rights Allocation–mixed ownership State-owned enterprises investment efficiency‖and―Control Rights Allocation characteristics–equity structure–mixed ownership State-owned enterprises investment efficiency‖,selects relevant data of listed mixed ownership enterprises and foreign enterprises from 2013 to 2017,using multiple regression and Different in Different（DID）method to test the influence of control rights allocation reform on state-owned enterprises investment efficiency in mixed ownership reform,especially the relationship among control rights equivalence,control rights balance,control rights concentration,control rights independence and state-owned enterprises investment efficiency,and further analysis the role of equity structure in the relationship between the two.The research conclusion shows:（1）The reform of control rights allocation can significantly improve the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises.（2）The degree of control rights equivalence and control rights balance have a significant improvement on the underinvestment level of mixed ownership state-owned enterprises,while it increases the level of overinvestment of enterprises;the lower the control rights concentration,the overinvestment level of mixed ownership state-owned enterprise deteriorates,and the underinvestment is effectively alleviated;The higher the control rights independence,the higher the investment efficiency of mixed ownership state-owned enterprises.（3）Considering the concentration of equity,when the concentration of equity is high,the mitigation of control rights balance to underinvestment and the deterioration of control rights balance to overinvestment for mixed ownership state-owned enterprises are more significant;At the same time,when the concentration of equity is low,the control rights independence is more obvious to the improvement of investment efficiency.（4）Considering the equity balance,in the high equity balance group,it is more pronounced to the improvement levels of underinvestment and the deterioration degrees of overinvestment from the control rights equivalence in mixed ownership state-owned enterprises.At the same time,the lower the control rights concentration,the lower the underinvestment level of mixed ownership state-owned enterprise is,and the higher the overinvestment situation is.While in low equity balance group,the lower the control rights concentration,the higher the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises in mixed ownership reform.The innovations and significance in this paper are as follows:（1）On the basis of mixed ownership reform,the paper studies the influence of control rights allocation characteristics on investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises systematically and deeply from the perspective of the intrinsic characteristics of control rights equivalence,balance,concentration and independence,which realizes the characterization of control rights allocation for state-owned enterprises and provides empirical evidence for optimizing control rights reform and its allocation.（2）The paper places the control rights reform and allocation on the basis of equity structure（equity concentration or equity balance）,further inspecting the role of equity structure on the relationship of the two,which completing the research process of equity and control rights from single to integration and providing a theoretical basis for the optimization of equity structure and control rights structure.（3）Research on the relationship of control rights allocation and state-owned enterprises can enrich the literature of influencing factors of investment efficiency.The conclusions of this paper have the following policy recommendations:（1）To optimize the control rights structure is as important as equity structure,reasonably determine the equivalence,balance,concentration,and independence of control rights,and maintain the control rights allocation at a reasonable level,is vital to improve state-owned enterprises investment efficiency in mixed ownership reform.（2）In the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,it is vital to further strengthen the construction of board of directors,and give full play to the complementary advantages of heterogeneous directors,which can help to form an efficient and balanced corporate governance structure,improve the social competitiveness of state-owned enterprises,and promote the reform of state-owned enterprises.