Research On The Impact Of Corporate Control Rights Allocation On Investment Preferences Under The Mixed Ownership Reform

In November 2013,the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Party was successfully held.It was proposed that the development of a mixed ownership economy with various capitals becoming one of the major tasks of deepening reforms in China.Since then,the introduction of non-state-owned capital to participate in the reform has become the direction of a new round of reform of China's state-owned enterprises.At present,the wave of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises has swept the country,and mixed-owned enterprises have become an indispensable part of China's market economy.Many state-owned enterprises have reallocated their control rights after absorbing non-state-owned capital and administrative reforms,and their investment preferences have also changed.In this context,the thesis takes Yunnan Baiyao Group Co.,Ltd.as an example to analyze the impact of the allocation of control rights of enterprises under the mixed reform on their investment preferences and their mechanism.First,the thesis introduces the background and significance of the topic and the literature review at home and abroad,and then defines the concept of enterprise control rights allocation and investment preferences,and expounds the relevant theoretical basis.Secondly,this article describes the basic situation and the mixed ownership reform of Yunnan Baiyao,and carefully analyzes the allocation of control rights and investment preferences of enterprises under mixed reform.And it is concluded that this change in the reconfiguration of corporate control rights will inhibit corporate fixed asset investment and promote the company 's long-term equity investment and R & D investment.On this basis,this article takes managers,shareholders and external investors who can affect the main body of corporate control as the entry point,and selects the perspective of managers 'incentive constraints,the perspective of shareholders' equity balance and the investor's bounded rationality From the perspective of behavior analysis,we further study the mechanism of the effect of corporate control rights allocation on investment preferences,and at the same time demonstrate the conclusion again.Finally,this article summarizes the relevant conclusions,and at the same time puts forward some suggestions for the state-owned enterprises preparing for mixedreform: First,State-owned enterprises should establish and improve the incentive and constraint system for managers;Second,State-owned enterprises should build a diversified and balanced shareholding structure;Third,State-owned enterprises should correctly handle the relationship with external investors.