The Political Economics Analysis On Property Services In Residential Areas Of China

The modernization of grass-roots governance system and governance capacity is the cornerstone of our country’s national governance building.Under the background of urbanization and post-industrialization,effective community governance is particularly important.Property service is the most direct area in community governance in recent years,which has a high degree of concern to the masses.It is also a more prominent area of conflict of interests.According to China’s Property Law and Property Management Regulations,a system of property services has been formed,which community owners constituting owners’congress,the owners’ congress choosing property service enterprises,and the owners’Committee supervising property services.However,over the years,disputes over property services keep appearing,this prompted people to constantly reflect on the system arrangement:Should the system design continue to be retained?If it should be retained,how should it be improved?If not,what system should replace it?Political economics is the study of the production relations among different economic bodies in society,that is,the material interests relations among various interest bodies and their development laws.In view of the particularity of property services,political economics methods can provide a more unique perspective and propose more reasonable solutions.It is a feasible way to study the interest status of interest groups in property services and to analyze how to adjust the interest relationship between them with the research method of political economy.Based on the basic research thoughts of political economics,this paper firstly analyses the different interest bodies and property rights forms involved in property services,puts forward the characteristics of public goods and quasi-public goods of property services,and then analyses the mismatch between property services characteristics and property services enterprises as commercial bodies,and points out that this is the fundamental reason for the frequent contradictions of property services.It is believed that the government,market and society as property service providers should be determined according to different property rights forms.The power-responsibility relationship determintation provides a general analytical framework for defining the rights and responsibilities of the relevant subjects in community service.Afterwards,it analyses the form of common property rights in property services,and concludes that the common property rights involved in property areas include different groups of owners.This complexity leads to the difficulty of straightening out the relationship between property services.From the point of view of protecting the common interests of owners,the relevant groups of owners should realize collective action,but there are great difficulties in the spontaneous realization of collective action of owners.Using the multi-agent game model and Ostrom’s comprehensive method,this paper analyses the collective action of owners in closed and open residential districts.It is believed that the opening of residential districts is conducive to the collective action of owners.However,the spontaneous collective action of owners is fragile,and it is still difficult to cope with the complex problem of maintaining the common interests of owners.In addition,the collective action of owners also faces the problems of obstruction of property enterprises,inadequate guidance from grass-roots governments and their relevant departments.This paper probes into the feasible path of collective action of owners,and points out the importance of giving full play to China’s political advantages and promoting collective action of owners and coordinating the relations among owners,property enterprises and developers through the establishment of grass-roots party organizations.Next,the interest relationship among the stakeholders in the property service under the closed condition of the community is discussed.The chain of multi-task principal-agent relationship between employers,owners’Committee and property service enterprises is analyzed.It is considered that due to the complexity of property service tasks and the non-index nature of some tasks,it is difficult for owners’ interest groups to accurately assess property service enterprises.According to the analysis conclusion of using Holmstrom-Milgrom model,this paper puts forward some measures to improve the principal-agent relationship in property services.It is believed that the behavior of property enterprises and owners’committees should be standardized by perfecting laws and administrative regulations,so as to improve the detectability of the work of property enterprises and owners’ committees,and make their efforts equal to their benefits.Opening residential quarter is a major policy change involving property services in recent years.This paper analyses the impacts of community opening on various stakeholders,and compares the changes of interests between closed and open communities.By discussing the coordination of stakeholders’interests,this paper explores the feasible way to realize the opening of closed residential areas.This paper probes into the interest relationship of the relevant stakeholders in property service after the opening of residential quarters,and draws lessons from the property management mode of the open residential areas outside the country,and analyses what kind of institutional arrangements should be made after the opening of residential quarters in order to realize the coordination of interests and the harmony of property regional.On the basis of the above analysis and through the analysis of political economics,this paper points out a state that the interests of various interest groups in property services should be.It rethinks the existing property-related systems in residential areas,and believes that the system of property services needs a systematic reconstruction.Suggestions on amendment of laws and regulations,administrative rules and regulations concerning property services,and statute system of community management are put forward.This paper seeks to establish a reasonable protection of the rights and interests of owners,smooth expression of the interests of all parties,full protection of the interests of various interest groups,benign interaction between the main bodies of the system,to ensure the harmonious operation of property services,and improve the level of grass-roots governance.In the conclusion part,the theoretical results of this study are summarized and refined briefly,and the main policy recommendations and research findings are summarized.The direction and focus of the next research on property services are discussed,in order to expand the research results of this paper,so that the research results can really achieve the effect of improving property services.From the perspective of political economics,this paper empirically studies the status quo of the interest relationship between different interest bodies involved in property services,normatively analysises the analysis of the rationality and irrationality of the status quo of this interest relationship,and gives some ideas for redesigning the existing system.The study on the political economics of property services of residential areas is mainly to discuss specific economic and social issues from the political economics analysis perspective and analysis paradigm,which is a practical expansion of the application of political economics,the research contents and achievements are conducive to the promotion and development of political economics,especially socialist political economics with Chinese characteristics.