Research On The Land Planning Governance Mode Under The Central-Local Relations

Regarding China's land planning system since the reform and opening-up policy,it is necessary to understand the phenomena of central-local power division and planning performance from governance structure level.Although the existing studies have focused on the behaviors of the central and local governments and specific operating processes in land planning governance,the research on the mode of land planning governance through the theoretical perspective of centralization and decentralization is still comparatively rare.Based on the existing literature and following the paradigm of national governance,this paper proposed that the mode of “decentralization within centralization” was an important institutional arrangement for understanding how China's land planning system operated.We provided the empirical evidence that local decentralization strategies positively affected the land planning performance and tried to incorporate the central selective centralization into the interpretation of the central-local planning power division.As the name suggests,the mode of “decentralization within centralization” was used to describe the organization mechanism which local decentralization embedded in central centralization in the process of land planning governance.The main characteristics of this mode were decentralization incentive and centralization control under administrative contract.Through theoretical construction,this paper argued that governance efficiency and land risk were basic logic of the “decentralization within centralization” mode.Governance efficiency refers to the efficiency of the central government as country's ruler to deal with land planning tasks(e.g.,guarantee economic development and protect farmland),reflecting in the size of governance costs.Land risk refers to the threat to the central ruling authority and regime stability caused by the implementation of land planning affairs from local governments as agents.In China,where there is a vast territory and complex local condition,in order to improve the governance efficiency of land planning,the central government has to delegate powers to the local governments,while to decrease the land risks casued by local governments agency,the central government must have the authority of selective centralization.Therefore,the central-local behavior strategies of decentralized incentives and centralized control are appeared in the mode of “decentralization within centralization”The empirical study of this paper demonstrated how the decentralization strategies of local governments improved the economic performance and non-economic performance of land planning through case studies from Zhejiang and Fujian provience.We found that due to the endogenous incentives for land finance and political promotion,local governments and local officials had the motivation to carry out decentralized operation of land quotas.The planning innovations at local level included flexible quotas and extra quotas,the former increased the planning flexibility and the latter loosened tight control of quotas.These decentralization strategies mitigated the dilemma of top-down quota distribution,effectively guaranteeing the local economic development.In the face of insufficient incentives for farmland supplement,under the encouragement of the central government's policy,inspired local governments gradually developed a decentralization strategy of “land project system”,which improved the efficiency of public good(e.g.farmland protection)supply by project competitive application and departmental funds integration.Another key point of this paper was to explain land risk principle of planning power division through control strategy of the central government.Given the background of “development by land expansion”,the behavior of local governments was deviated from farmland protection,and the result may bring the food security issue and threaten the rule of a country.Thus,decreasing this land risk became the behavior logic of selective centralization and power division adjustment by the central governmet.Using econometrics analysis of the approval authority adjustment of land use general plan at prefecture-level in 2009,we found that land risk was an important factor affecting the central government to get the certain planning power back.If the land risk in a region was high,the central government would control the planning power through centralization.Finally,the future trends and research directions of “decentralization within centralization” mode were also discussed briefly in this paper.