Kant's Refutation of the Ontological Proof

I argue that Kant's main problem with the ontological proof in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) is epistemological in nature as opposed to the standard or Fregean reading that treats it as primarily about the logical function of "exist." According to Frege, existence is a second-order property of concepts, rather than a first-order property of individuals. But the ontological proof presupposes that existence is a property of individuals. So, the ontological proof fails. Close readings of relevant sections in Kant's corpus reveal that Kant's problem with the ontological proof primarily has to do with the use of reason, independently of the understanding, in extending what we can claim to exist beyond the scope of possible experience. The lack of any sensible or experiential ground for any cognition of God's existence makes the ontological proof impossible. Existence claims, for Kant, must be about something that can be represented through sensible intuition and understanding. God, as a mere idea, cannot be represented in such a way. Many contemporary defenders of the ontological proof, critics of Kant's refutation, and supporters of Kant's refutation accept the standard reading (SR). But, considering that SR is inadequate, there is a need to correct it. It is important to correct the standard reading not only for a proper reading of Kant's refutation but also and more importantly for a proper estimation of its philosophical and historical reach, notably its possible refutation of the classic formulations of the ontological proof.;In chapter 1, I attempt to establish the relation of what Kant says about the ontological proof in one of his lectures on natural theology to Descartes, Leibniz, Crusius, and Baumgarten. Chapter 1 addresses the issue about Kant's actual target in his refutation of the ontological proof. It should at least help us determine the kind of ontological proof that Kant has in mind. In chapter 2, I address Kant's view of reason and reason's vulnerabilities to different sorts of illusions, especially theistic illusion. I am primarily concerned with the role of reason in the formation of theistic illusion. For Kant, the faculty of reason, as distinguished from the faculty of understanding, is responsible for the transcendental illusion. Such illusion, for Kant, is natural, unavoidable, and inextinguishable. It arises as reason, due to its distinctive functions, naturally and inevitably extends its reach beyond the scope of possible experience. It pretentiously determines the objective existence of some things (including God) outside the bounds of possible experience. Considering the lack of direct relation between reason and the realm of possible experience, reason cannot make judgments about existence. Chapter 2 should help us understand what exactly is Kant's problem with the ontological proof by situating what he said about it in the context of his argument in Transcendental Dialectic.;Chapter 3 analyzes relevant passages in Kant's corpus with particular attention to the specific section of CPR that directly addresses the ontological proof. It highlights the advantages of my reading of Kant's refutation of the ontological proof over SR. By using SR as the account of Kant's refutation of the ontological proof in CPR, the richness, effectiveness, and coherence of Kant's refutation are undermined, since SR fails to account for its multifaceted nature, its compelling force independently of one's view about the non-predicative nature of existence, and its continuity with Kant's argument in Transcendental Dialectic. My reading of Kant's refutation aims to show that it is much more complex than SR, it does not rise or fall based on the truth of Kant's controversial claim about existence, and it is an outgrowth of Kant's argument in Transcendental Dialectic.