| This dissertation illustrates several practical and theoretical reasons for distinguishing between justifications and excuses. It is argued, for example, that the distinction helps us understand the nature of punishment. This, in turn, sheds light on certain foundational issues of substantive and procedural criminal law. Regarding the substantive criminal law, it is argued that the distinction allows courts to better understand what is at stake when defendants claim that duress ought to be a defense to a crime involving the killing of innocent human beings. With regard to the procedural criminal law, the dissertation demonstrates that the justification/excuse distinction provides an appealing and coherent framework with which to approach the Supreme Court's "beyond a reasonable doubt" jurisprudence. Finally, in spite of the utility of invoking the justification/excuse distinction in these contexts, I argue that the distinction is not without its shortcomings. Therefore, I suggest that the best way of dealing with certain controversial cases is to afford to the actors involved a defense that shares features of both justification and excuse defenses. |
