Seizing domestic tranquility: National military intervention in America, 1866--1940

Since the Whiskey Rebellion, American presidents have directed law enforcement campaigns against domestic protest movements, labor unions, criminal syndicates, and high-profile activists. Ulysses S. Grant fought white supremacist groups during Reconstruction; Grover Cleveland and Rutherford B. Hayes suppressed railroad and miner strikes, and Woodrow Wilson combated perceived domestic communist insurgencies and foreign bandits like Pancho Villa. The link between these "small emergencies" is that presidents relied upon the armed forces to suppress them. American political development and presidency research on emergency executive power, coercive force agencies, and the national security state have exploded since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Few scholars, however, have studied when and why presidents have utilized the office's "domestic war powers," especially authority to use force at home, to confront large-scale social unrest. With original data drawn from thousands of newspaper articles, this dissertation analyzes over 800 domestic conflict events to explore state and national military intervention patterns in the U.S. between 1866 and 1940. It employs econometric techniques and rare-events methodology previously only applied to international conflicts. It argues that American federalism creates a "security paradox" for presidents when deciding to use the military as a domestic constabulary. It also posits a theory on the evolution of the laws governing domestic force use, including the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This work contributes to ongoing research dealing with executive law enforcement practices under federalism, the development of the national security state, and the origins of the "modern" presidency.