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Taming the imperial presidency: Congress, presidents and the conduct of military action

Posted on:2007-06-14Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:Harvard UniversityCandidate:Kriner, Douglas LFull Text:PDF
GTID:1456390005480477Subject:Political science
Abstract/Summary:
A burgeoning literature has emerged in recent years on the domestic political factors influencing the presidential use of force; however, virtually every such study focuses exclusively on the politics governing the initial decision of whether or not to intervene militarily in response to a foreign crisis. Yet after troops are committed, presidents make hundreds of decisions on their missions' conduct. Surely they are not made in a political vacuum. Furthermore, once American boots are on the ground, the political stakes and incentives government actors face fundamentally change. This dissertation explores the influence of Congress and of domestic politics more generally on the scope and duration of major military actions since 1877.; Beginning with Madison's observation that for one branch of government to check effectively another "the interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place," the dissertation theorizes that partisanship, which critically governs individual Congressmen's incentives to support or oppose the president, is the key factor driving inter-branch conflict over the conduct of military action. Presidents bolstered by strong partisan majorities on Capitol Hill should have more political leeway to employ extended, large-scale military actions in pursuit of their foreign policy goals than their peers facing considerable partisan opposition in Congress.; Empirical analyses demonstrate both the scope of congressional influence over the conduct of military policy and the mechanisms by which the legislature can raise or lower the political costs of a military venture for the president. Military actions initiated when the president's partisan opponents hold sway on Capitol Hill are considerably shorter and smaller in scale than endeavors launched in periods of strong, unified partisan control of both branches. Congress, usually driven by the opposition party, is able to influence military policymaking, even without legally compelling the president to change course, both directly via the signals it sends through legislative votes to authorize or curtail an ongoing action and indirectly through its Members' arguments for or against the operation in the public sphere. Domestic politics have never stopped at the water's edge, nor do they cease to influence policymaking once American troops are in the field.
Keywords/Search Tags:Military, President, Congress, Conduct, Political, Influence
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