Playing the ethnic card: Party networks and violence in the Balkans

This dissertation examines why, during the multiparty transitions of the early 1990s, in the former Yugoslavia ruling elites in Serbia---working with party allies in Croatia---sponsored large-scale, ethnic cleansing, whereas in Romania leaders did not employ this tactic. In Croatia (1991--1995), Bosnia (1992--1995) and Kosovo (1999), cleansing along ethnic and religious lines by Serbian forces backed by Belgrade led to the deaths of an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 people and the forcible displacement of one to two million residents.;The first part of the dissertation tests theories drawn from influential literature on state failure, ethnic cleavages and violence. The dissertation compares the ability of state authorities to maintain law and order during the transition periods across the cases. It considers whether, in Yugoslavia, a decline in police capacity occurred prior to the onset of ethnic cleansing. The dissertation then introduces the ethnic cleansing campaigns and documents the evidence linking state officials to the covert militias which sponsored the violence. It assesses the debate about ethnic cleavages and violence by evaluating the level of inter-communal conflicts during the transitions across the two cases.;The second part of the dissertation tests a theory on party strength to explain the variation. It posits that, during transitions, the risk of ethnic cleansing hinges on the strength of the ruling party and its opposition to reform. Ruling parties which reject reform and prove internally stable, with steady cooperation among elites and a developed party organization, are more likely to employ large-scale, ethnic violence. The dissertation surveys the highly contested multiparty transitions in the former Yugoslavia and Romania and traces the critical variation in ruling party development and elite cohesion among the set. The dissertation argues that leaders in Serbia, working with their party allies in Croatia, drew on exceptional levels of party strength and elite stability to sponsor ethnic cleansing against opponents during the early phases of multiparty rule. In Romania rulers were beset by conflicts inside as well as outside the ruling party, lacked a vibrant party apparatus and instead employed small scale violence against political rivals.