| Why do some governments implement full-scale reforms of public service delivery, while others do so in a superficial manner? The uneven use of new information and communication technologies in developing countries raises this question in a stark new way. In this dissertation, I draw on empirical analysis of sub-national policy across the Indian states to explain variation in the ways governments use new technologies to reform service delivery to citizens.;I argue that politicians attempt to use technology initiatives to maximize their chances of retaining power, but that these policies have both potential benefits and costs. Politicians anticipate electoral benefits from improved services. However, because new technologies can be used to streamline government services, they also limit the ability of politicians to generate and appropriate "rents" from inefficiencies in service delivery. Often, politicians depend on corruption to stay in power---in India, for instance, bribes help to finance reelection campaigns---so the loss of rents constitutes a political, not purely economic, cost of adopting new technologies.;The institutional structure of government also affects the political costs and benefits of technology policies---in particular, through the contrasting dynamics of single-party and coalition systems. I posit that party leaders in single-party systems internalize the electoral benefits of providing improved government services, while the costs in terms of foregone rents are borne largely by ministers with limited capacity to resist the party leader's policy directives. In coalition systems, minority ministers have greater power to resist directives, by threatening defection from the ruling coalition, and so can influence policy outcomes.;Drawing on fieldwork in seventeen Indian states, I use event history modeling, other quantitative analytic techniques, and qualitative case studies to show that more corrupt states and states with coalition governments implemented technology policies later and offer fewer services, while other indicators of economic or social development do not predict the characteristics of service reform. In coalition-led states, the selection of specific services is clearly related to the allocation of ministerial posts. A secondary time-series cross-sectional analysis of 125 countries examines the extent to which my argument can explain variation in technology-enabled reform in comparative perspective. |
