| In this dissertation, I examine the factors that lead various actors in a prison environment to construct and participate in inmate-run organizations meant to provide educational services to the prison population. Using face-to-face interviews with penitentiary administrators and staff, appointed public officials such as Commissioners of Corrections, and volunteers, as well as published and public documents from inmate groups, I investigate three broad research questions. First, "How do prison organizations work or function within the correctional facility?" Specifically, given the restriction of social and economic resources to inmates, how do prisoner associations adapt to the incarceration system, adjust to changes and, at the same time, ensure the operation of educational programs? I hypothesize that common bureaucratic features, such as organizational hierarchy and extensive rules and regulations, offer reliable and surprisingly flexible strategies that help inmates overcome the limitations and unexpected transformations within the larger penitentiary system. I find through the use of several bureaucratic features, such as state-backed charter and social networking, inmate run groups gain flexibility and maneuverability in their efforts to implement organizational programs within the correctional institution. Second, I focus on the processes that lead to the development of certain administrative structures within prison organizations. Correspondingly, I wonder. "What factors influence the organizations to create certain positions, decision-making processes, and governing procedures?" I hypothesize that various factors, particularly, "mimetic" and "coercive" pressures in the environment (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) alter the composition of alliances and arrangements necessary to maintain organizational efficiency. I find that through the institutions' control of space and movement, the prison system exerts normative, mimetic, and especially, coercive pressures on the structures and practices of inmate run associations. Third, "How do the managerial structures of prisoner associations change over time?" As hypothesized, I find that inmate-run organizations shift away from local autonomy or charismatic authority to become more like Weberian rational-legal bureaucracies, although some charismatic elements remain. Furthermore, I ponder in what direction the pattern of bureaucratization takes? Following Neo Fordist assertions, I postulate that due to environmental restraints and uncertainty, inmate groups' actions, composition, decisions, and processes have become more formalized and concentrated over their life course. Contrary to my expectations, I find that many organizations either change minimally or became less concentrated. Indeed, more consistent with Contingency theorists, I discover that inmate-operated organizations decentralized decision-making and bureaucratic structure in order to respond to organizational growth and the environment instability. |
